



上智大学  
SOPHIA UNIVERSITY



# BEYOND THE BORDERS

*Report on  
Migration  
and Development  
Course [2016-2019]*

Sophia University  
Center for Global Education & Discovery





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## Foreword

International migration is one of the primary focus areas during my assignment to the ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific. I learned of the tragedy involving migrant workers in construction sites of the stadiums for the World Cup 2022, the case of forced labour of Myanmarese fishermen on Thai fishing boats, accompanied minors in the USA. The 2015 influx of migrants from conflict-ridden areas of Middle-East, Asia and Africa into Europe and BREXIT have challenged the Schengen Treaty and even threatens the unity of the EU.

Past 50 years of globalisation brought forth a number of positive and impressive economic developments but one must admit it has unraveled some negative consequences such as widening income gap, global warming, depleting natural resources, human and labour rights violations. Nonetheless, international migration continues and is even growing. I wish to add that Asia, once traditionally migrant-sending region is now the destination of a quarter of Asian migrants according to the United Nations. Due to demographic changes Republic of Korea, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, and Brunei are facing with a declining population and consequent labour shortages. On the other hand, Myanmar, Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines, Cambodia and Laos are origins of labour migrants within Asia.

Though migration related issues persist international migration should not be a problem but could be part of solutions. While they are in search for better lives escaping from hopeless unemployment, poor economy, insecurity, violation of human rights, internal conflicts, inadequate social protection, and natural disasters etc. They are solutions to labour shortages and economy of destination countries, and benefiting them in many other ways.

When I returned to Japan, I often read news and articles on human and labour rights violations of the technical intern trainees. I realise that it is not only in the countries with less institutional capacity for labour protection, one observes such social issues but also in richer countries which claim democracy and the rule of the law. Turning our eyes on Japan one understands that Japan has started to open the labour market to foreign workers accepting Japanese descents from Brazil in the 80s, developed the Technical Intern Training Programme in 1993 and further renewed the programme to recognise labour as labour, instead of disguising it as a training programme. Despite the move one still finds in Japan problems such as delayed payment of wages, confiscation of passports, restricted labour mobility, and other forms of human/labour rights violation.

Though both the world and Japan have made great efforts in managing international migration, we still have a long way to go, and a lot to do to make international migration fair and productive in order to realise "triple wins" for all three parties concerned - destination countries, origin countries and migrants themselves. Sophia University, given its mission - "Women and men for others and with others" is happy to have opened this course on migration and co-existence four years ago. We hope to contribute to the efforts of others in pursuit of humanity and services to the disadvantaged populations in particular those migrants who need and deserve all sorts of support and in order to achieve the triple wins.

**Yoshiteru Uramoto**

Distinguished Professor

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## Introduction

The Influx of migrants into Europe in 2015 is still vivid in our memory. 1.8 million people mainly from conflict ridden zones of Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Africa crossed borders into Europe undocumented. The level of influx has slowed down, however, migrants continue to enter Europe. This has become a controversial issue that poses threats to social and economic security and is challenging the Schengen Treaty and even the unity of European Union. While the number of migrants into Europe remains large, Asia and the middle east, origin countries in the past, are now the destination of 80 million migrants, over a third of the total migrant stock of a quarter of a billion. For example, Qatar, like other Gulf countries, attracts migrants for low skill jobs such as construction workers and domestic workers. The workplace of Asian migrant workers in the construction sites of the 2022 Football World Cups stadiums was caught attention of international media and the international community as a serious case of human and labour rights violation. Work in the Construction sector and other sectors such as manufacturing, fishery and agriculture as well as services sectors like domestic workers attract low skilled workers, whose work environment is known to be difficult, dangerous and dirty and segmented from the main labour markets. Once during my official mission as ILO Regional Director, I met the Prime Minister of Nepal who confessed his deep concern over the daily return of his countrymen in coffins.

Many migrants-sending countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Nepal and Bangladesh often promote jobs abroad for their nationals and facilitate migration as a priority labour issue. They are also very actively involved in the protection of their migrant population by setting up policies and programmes in the destination countries through their embassies. The Philippines is a model case for this. However, the capacity of governments of the sending countries to protect the migrants is limited as the rules and regulations and the prevailing practices in the destination countries dominate. Private recruitment agencies in both origin and destination countries play an influential role in helping the process of migration but which often goes against the interest of the migrants. Nothing is free. They need to borrow money to pay for visas, transportation, living costs for initial months of migration, service fees to recruitment agents etc. They are often financially in debt before leaving their countries and prone to exploitation. Why then migration continues and never stops, or even growing? Well everybody knows many successful migrants transfer home lots of money. The world sum of remittances by migrants far exceeds the sum of official development assistance and even foreign direct investment. Remittances are now thought of as a resource for development in the origin countries and for economic growth. If domestic growth and well-paid jobs are available, people need not to go

abroad. Considering quite a number of migrants choose to stay and settle in the destination countries, considerable knowledge and skills earned through the experience is lost - brain drain instead of applying them back home upon return - brain gain. It is not clear whether or not the international migration actually helps contribute toward the development in the origin countries remains as a debated issue.

Many destination countries face demographic and structural changes. Their populations are aging and declining resulting in severe labour shortages. Some destination countries welcome immigrants to cope with labour shortages. USA and Europe are typical countries which relied upon migrants in order to overcome shortages of labour. The Schengen treaty of the EU has been instrumental of the growth and development of the EU member states. Meanwhile the USA is built on migration and greatly benefited from emigration. On the contrary, sending countries face chronic unemployment and underemployment. It is natural that those in the origin countries with unemployment and shortage of decent jobs desire to migrate for better pay, opportunities and better life. It is also natural that they wish to bring their families, gain citizenship and seek a better future for them and their families.

Native communities in destination countries perceive the migration in various ways. There can be some conflict between the natives and migrant communities. Integration is an unavoidable agenda for all destination countries as migrants often experience discrimination and hostility. Once a country accepts migrants it is the country's responsibility to treat them as human beings and respect their rights. However, all recognise that the situation needs to be improved. Otherwise the needs of destination countries would never be met and the current model of migration will never be sustainable. Destination countries and their communities need to satisfy their needs of labour, tax revenue, resources for social protection and sound population growth to maintain the economy, curve demographic trends and proceed with the desired structural change. Migrants once admitted for any reason must be ensured of their human and labour rights and migrant-friendly environment for integration in order to ensure win-win solutions for both parties. ILO promotes "triple wins" as good management of migration which would serve both destination and sending countries as well as migrants themselves. We should not lose sight of the vision of triple-win solutions for fair, productive and prosperous co-existence. What choice do we have in order to strike a balance for coexistence and prosperity? This is the question the course wishes to pose to students and lecturers.

Japan is at a critical juncture. What are the options for Japan to face and overcome the aging population and labour shortages? In order to learn from the real world, we took a closer look at

several cases such as Myanmar fishermen in Thai fishing boats, female domestic workers in Gulf countries, Singapore and Hong Kong, construction workers in Qatar, Philippines' policy and programme for outgoing migration, European migration policies, Brazilian of Japanese descent in Japan and their children's education etc. It is encouraging to know that Global Compact on Migration has been agreed upon at the UN General Assembly in 2018 and that 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development - SDGs adopted better management of migration as a target.

The course was conducted in English. We made every effort to provide the class with a great learning opportunity for all. All sessions were highly interactive and all students were involved in class debate and requested to provide their feedback either by sending their reaction paper or communicating their comments in the class. Copies of Power Point presentations to be used for every session were uploaded in the Moodle site for prior perusal. The mid-term examination was conducted to see if students have understood the migration theories and gained some basic analytical tools of the cases presented during the class. Students were grouped to form a team and requested to select their own issue, do research, and analyse the issue at the level of manifestations, immediate causes, and underlying and basic causes. In the end they presented their policy recommendations for class debate. The final reports were submitted elaborating the content of the group work into their own individual reports. You will find in the attachment to this report some papers that were actually written by students. You will be surprised by the quality of the papers. Another positive aspect of the course was its diversity of the students. We constantly have students from all over the world. Views and attitudes in the class were very diverse, which contributed enormously to the understanding the issues and in turn to the quality of our classroom discussion. Though being financially not very resourceful we managed to invite the experts who have on-the-ground experiences, in a particular, with migration issue to lecture and share their views directly with students. If you take a look at the example of the 2019 syllabus, you will realise the efforts we have made to provide students the best and rich information and data to learn the very reality of international migration.

Last but not least, the course benefited from the MEXT Inter-University Exchange Project "Human Dignity and Harmonization in Migration and Coexistence" - Sophia-Nanzan Latin America Programme with financial support from the Government of Japan. The 2019 syllabus of the course is hereby attached for information.

## **Migration and Co-existence 2: Migration and Development 2019**

### **Introduction 2 October**

Introduction to the course Migration and Development 2020: dimensions and dynamics of international migration (Uramoto/Murata). A short video clip will be shown and main issues discussed.

### **A key Issue of International Migration in Qatar 9 October**

The key issue to discuss during this class is Migrant workers in Qatar. Mr Max Tunon, ILO senior project officer will be invited from Qatar to discuss on the issues taken up by the video clip on migrant workers for the construction football stadiums for FIFA World Cup 2022. Qatar like other countries in Gulf is characterised by its heavy dependency on migrant workers for practically all areas of their economy. The plight of migrant workers are often raised as a serious case of human rights abuse. What are the issues? What can be done to protect their rights? Why people migrates and what are the consequences of migration? Mr Max Tunon will share his long and extensive experiences in migration and in particular in Qatar.

### **Multinational Migration and EU with focus on UK, 16 October**

Prof Murata will give a lecture on the Schengen Agreement of 1995 and UK's migration policy and the role of remittances in the sending countries.

### **Sending Country: Philippines 23 October**

The Philippines is a major sending country to many destination countries. The milestones in the recent history of migration of the Philippines will be presented in order to assess how migration has benefited or not benefited the development of the country. In short the lecture is aimed at providing students with various dimensions of migration and also a glimpse of how migration transforms economies and societies in particular for sending countries by focusing on the Philippines as a case. Lecturers (Manuel Imson / Uramoto) will attempt to provide students with a picture of a sending country along with causes and consequences of migration in the Philippines.

### **Migration Policies of RoK, Destination Country 30 October**

Dr Jeong-Yoon Cho President, Korea Association of Skills and Qualifications will give a lecture on migration policy and issues faced in RoK and its Employment Permission System.

### **Theories of Migration 6 November**

Prof Uramoto will review theories of migration: 3.4% of the world population are international migrants. However small or big in percentage the international migration outcome is very apparent in both origin and destination countries. Who are migrants? What causes migration? What are the outcome of international migration?

### **Migration Policy in destination countries 13 November**

Prof. Murata will explain the migration policies both in destination and sending countries. The former policies include the quest for control over cross-border movements. The latter policies focus on the migration and development, particularly the migration and remittances.

### **Migrants' integration into destination countries 20 November**

Prof. Uramoto and Dr. Murata will be introducing the concept of integration and the differing approaches and presenting a comparison of integration policies amongst some destination countries using the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Discussing host hostility and nativism; immigrants and residential segregation; language acquisition; migration in welfare states.

### **Mid-Term Exam 27 November**

### **Guidance for group discussion on case study materials 4 December**

Guiding students on group work. Topics can be chosen from the given list. The list contains issues between sending and destination countries.

Japan's migration policy is one of the issues to be discussed during the group presentation. (Murata/Uramoto)

### **Briefing on Case Studies: Group exercise and production of presentation on selected issues. 11 December**

Group exercise for the case and discussion on analysis and formulation of policy recommendations (Murata/Uramoto)

### **Group Presentation (1) 18 December**

Two group presentation (Murata/Uramoto)

### **Presentation (2) 8 January**

Group presentation by group.(Murata/Uramoto)

### **Presentation (3) 15 January**

Group presentation by group (Murata/Uramoto)

### **Preparation of the final report 22 Jan**

Report on case studies used in group discussions and PPPs presented by groups (Murata/Uramoto)

## Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge the contributions made by Dr Aiko Kikkawa, Economist at Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department ADB - former Ph.D. candidate, State Building and Economic Development Program/JSPS Research Fellow, National Graduate Research Institute of Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan and Dr Akira Murata, Lecturer, Chiba Keizai University and Visiting Scholar at JICA Research Institute. Both being professional experts on international migration had been lecturers and helped me to plan the sessions. Along with them were Dr. Soison Erica Paula, Ph.D. and lecturer University of Tokyo and Ms. Beatrice Melo Ph.D. candidate Graduate School Global Studies Sophia University. Dr. Erica Sioson has given lectures on the integration of Filipino in Japan. Ms. Beatrice Melo has always been much more than Teaching Assistant for the course but help me develop the format of this report and numerous managerial and operational support for the course. They all formed an effective team to ensure the productive learning opportunities for the students enrolled in the course.

I would like to take this opportunity to introduce my team.



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Faculty of Liberal Arts,  
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Besides the above-mentioned team we were blessed with talented lecturers from Asia. We wish to acknowledge valuable contributions made by the following lecturers.

Dr. Pyasiri Wikramasekara, Former Senior Migration Specialist ILO Geneva; Ms. Thetis Mangahas, former Deputy Regional Director ILO for Asia and the Pacific Region Bangkok; Mr. Manuel Imson, Former ILO Senior Programme Officer for ASEAN, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific and Deputy Minister of Labour , Philippines; Dr. Young-bum, Park, Hansung University RoK; Dr. Jeong-Yoon, Cho, Executive Director, International Institute of Employment Development RoK; Mr. Max Tunon, ILO Qatar; Associate Professor Md Mizanur Rahman, University Brunei Darussalam; and Mr. Yasuyuki Kato, former migration consultant to ILO Bangkok.

My appreciation is also extended to Ms. Tomoe Yoshino and Ms. Tomoe Kimura, organising Sophia-Nanzan Latin America Program (LAP) under the Centre for Global Education and Discovery at Sophia University, for their indispensable administrative and operational support for the course. I also wish to thank Ms. Midori Nakajima, former staff of the Centre for Global Education and Discovery who provided resourceful advice in initiating the course in 2016.

# Chapter 1

## 1. Why migration and how the course is designed

The UN defines an international migrant as any person who stays outside the country of residence for more than one year - long-term migrants. The world stock of international migrants is estimated to be 272 million (or 3.5 % of the world population) in 2019, an increase of 24 million from the Syria induced influx in 2015 (UN DESA) and an increase of over 100 million from 2000. This includes refugees but excludes those migrated in the country of their residence.

Globalisation and migration: With modern internet communication, mass media and mobile phone, international migration became easier than ever. It is no longer kept secret that many parts of the world are faced with lack of employment opportunities, political crisis, armed conflicts, poor economy, and inadequacy of social services and that many advanced countries offer better lives and opportunities for gainful employment. Informal networks of migrant workers and diaspora would provide a useful and

credible source of information that could greatly facilitate the migration.

Remittances: economic benefits of migration through remittances add great value to migration. In 2018, according to the World Bank, the total remittances in the world amounted to at least US\$600 billion, out of which an estimate of US\$529 billion was annual remittances flows to low- and middle-income countries. The flows to low- and middle-income countries excluding China were significantly larger than foreign direct investment flows in 2018 (US\$344 billion) and makes official development assistance (ODA) relatively small. In 2019 they are expected to become their largest source of external financing according to the World Bank. The average cost of sending money, however, remains high and is a target of SDG target 10.7, which is to reduce the remittance costs to 3 percent.

Government intervention: Migrant sending countries are actively engaged in promoting migration and protecting their nationals in destination countries. In the meanwhile destination countries face declining population and labour shortage. Sustainability of the economy, leave aside



its growth, is at risk. Aging population in many destination countries would face difficulties in receiving adequate pension and social services for their retired life. Migration is a serious agenda for such countries. Bilateral and multilateral agreements are employed to agree on the terms and conditions of migration. What would be the policies of sending and destination countries that best serve their interest?

Human migration is critical global issues that affect national economies both migrants and natives. How could labour migration be effectively managed for further development of the world economy? What regulatory framework should be developed in order to protect them from abuse? How could the social protection measures be extended for those migrant labourers? What can the governments, civil society, non-government organisations, and international organisations do to protect them? What does the international policy index (MIPEX) say about the integration policies of destination countries?

Throughout this interdisciplinary course on Migration and Development, causes

and consequences of migration will be the cross-cutting themes. Specific subjects of the course include: (1) dimensions and dynamics of international migration, (2) causes and consequences of labour migration in sending countries, (3) theories of migration, (4) migration policies of destination countries, (5) undocumented migration and protection of migrants, (5) brain drain, remittances and development (6) Migrants' integration in destination countries, and (7) future of international migration.

Significance of the course: The course is designed to help students in analysing the causes and consequences of international migration, to address the current issues of labour migration (not those of refugee and the history of international migration) which is critical to the development of the sending countries and also to the destination countries to shed light on the human and labour rights of migrants in destination countries in order to help students understand the significance of policies on international migration and how to find solutions to the migration related issues by applying appropriate and effective policies.

## 2. Migration and Development

### 2.1 Key players for “Migration and Development”

International migration used to be the subjects of history and area studies focusing on colonial pasts. Nowadays, international migration can be dealt with multidisciplinary approaches, including economics, sociology, anthropology, and politics.

In this course, we discussed the nexus of migration and development with the perspective of economics. Interestingly, international migration has been an important global agenda. Rich countries face the influx of foreign migrant workers, while poor countries send them abroad and receive remittances.

The following box shows the current key players for migration and development. For international organisations, international migration is not only an employment issue but also it is closely related to economic and financial issues of the country. So, the international organisations listed below have already been active on this topic. However, there is the lack of migration specialists,

particularly from Japan, within these organisations. This simply stems from low interest in international migration as a course among Japanese universities. As shown in the box below, most popular migration courses are provided by British, European and American universities. This course tries to fill in the serious knowledge gap in migration and development and provide the important opportunities to discuss this global agenda for students at the Sophia University.

### 2.2 Migration policies in sending countries

International migration moves people or human capital from one country to another. The 3Rs summarise the impacts that migrants can have on the development of their countries of origin: recruitment; remittances; and returns (or reintegration).

Among the 3Rs, we mainly discussed the effect of migrant remittances on migration and development in the classroom. Current important policy issues on migrant remittances are to encourage the more productive use of migrant remittances and to support financial inclusion which aims primarily at a shift

from informal to formal channels for migrant remittances.

### 2.3 Why are remittances important?

Remittance flows to low-and middle-income countries are larger than ODA and more stable than private capital flows. Nowadays, the total receipt of remittances into low-and middle-income countries has been greater than that of foreign direct investment (FDI) into these developing countries (see Figure 1).

According to the World Bank statistics, in 2018 India was the top remittance recipient country in terms of its total amount, which reached US\$ 79.5 billion. China was the second biggest remittance receiver reaching US\$ 67.4 billion. This is simply because these two countries have billions of populations and they have been included into the global economy which results in wide spread of migrant workers worldwide. This worldwide labor migration is also found in the Philippines which received US\$ 33.7 billion in 2018. The same remittance amounts (i.e. US\$33.7 billion) was sent by Mexican migrants who are mainly attracted by the USA (see Figure2).

## Box 1: Key players for “Migration and Development”


### *International Organizations*

- **World Bank: Migration and Remittances Unit**  
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/labormarkets/brief/migration-and-remittances>
- **World Bank’s Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD)**  
<https://www.knomad.org/>
- **OECD: Development Centre**  
<http://www.oecd.org/dev/migration-development/>
- **International Labour Organisation (ILO):**  
<http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm>
- **International Organisation for Migration (IOM):** <https://www.iom.int/migration>

### *Universities/Research Institutes*

- **Oxford University: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS):**  
<http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/>
- **University of Sussex: Sussex Centre for Migration Research:**  
<http://www.sussex.ac.uk/migration/>
- **Georgetown University: Institute for the Study of International Migration**  
<https://isim.georgetown.edu/>
- **Maastricht University: Maastricht Centre for Citizenship, Migration and Development**  
<https://macimide.maastrichtuniversity.nl/>
- **Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO):**  
<https://www.prio.org/Research/Group/?x=1>
- **University College London (UCL):**  
<http://www.geog.ucl.ac.uk/mru/>


**Figure 1. Remittance Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 1990-2019**



Another remittance figure shows the different picture about its recipient country. When we calculate the country's remittance dependency using the percentage of GDP, Tonga, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Nepal are found to be deeply depended on remittance receipts,

which reaches more than 30 percentage of the country GDP in 2018 (see Figure 2). The typical features of these remittance dependent countries are a small economy with the lack of national demand and job opportunities within the country.

**Figure 2. Top Remittance Receivers in 2018**



## 2.4 Migration and SDGs

Migration issues are included into Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The detailed goals and targets are summarised below. Among these migration related goals, there is one remittance target to be measured: By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent. This target has already been completed between the remittance corridors with a great demand

like a Kuwait to the Philippines corridor and a Russia to Tajikistan corridor, while the remittance costs are much higher between those with poor remittance services, for example in sub-Saharan Africa .

## 2.5 Role of remittances on development

The migration and remittances economics literature gives substantial attention to the analysis of remittances as potential contributors to the following issues in the migrant's countries of origin: savings;

### Box 2. Migration related Goals in SDGs

**Goal 5:** Achieve gender equality and empower all women: 5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including **trafficking** and sexual and other types of exploitation

**Goal 8:** Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all: 8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, **including migrant workers**, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment

**Goal 10:** Reduce inequality within and among countries: 10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible **migration and mobility** of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies 10.c By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of **migrant remittances** and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent

**Goal 16:** Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels: 16.2 end abuse, exploitation, **trafficking** and all forms of violence and torture against children

**Goal 17:** Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development: 17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, **migratory status**, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

(Source: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>)

investment; financial development; and economic growth. This means that migrant remittances contribute to development at the household level as well as at the national level.<sup>1</sup> However, there is possible negative impact of remittances: remittance dependency. Remittances have sometimes been blamed for encouraging “wasteful” consumption by the recipients and impacting negatively on output by raising the reservation wage and discouraging work effort among recipient communities, and/or fueling unproductive and inflationary speculative expenditure on real estate.

## 2.6 Financial Inclusion

As shown before, the remittance flows into developing countries has been increasing over time. This is partly because of the improvement in official data. In addition, there is a shift from informal to formal remittance channels due to strong scrutiny after September 11, 2001.

According to the responses from the 2012 Survey of the Financial Development Barometer, one of the most effective policies to improve access to finance

among low-income borrowers was financial education. 32% of international staff and specialists in the financial industry agreed on it.

In developing countries, access to finance was one of the major development barriers among poor households. This situation has been dramatically improved with the use of mobile money accounts. According to the Global Findex Database 2014, 62% of adults on earth have an account at financial institutions or a mobile money account.

However, the Global Findex Report 2017 revealed that 1.7 billion poor adults remain excluded from the financial services. Nearly half of all unbanked adults live in just seven economies such as China (224million), India (191million), Pakistan (99million), Indonesia (96.6million), Nigeria (62.7million), Mexico (58.7million), and Bangladesh (57.9million).

Female’s financial inclusion has been improving from 2011 to 2017. But the gender gap in account ownership persists in developing economies.

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<sup>1</sup> For more details, see Murata (2011) and Murata (2017).

## 2.7 Financial Literacy for Remittances<sup>2</sup>

Currently, financial education for migrants and their families become one of the key development policies for migrant countries of origin. Financial literacy is defined as the knowledge of basic financial concepts and the ability and discipline to make wise individual and financial decisions (Kefela, 2011). Financial literacy is becoming increasingly important in empowering migrants and their families to strengthen their financial management capacities and to achieve financial independence. Financial literacy programs for migrants and their families vary, ranging from financial awareness and knowledge; financial skills, such as the ability to calculate compound interest payments; and financial capability more generally, in terms of money management and financial planning (Xu and Zia, 2013). Durana (2016) distinguishes the remittance-based programs and the non-remittance-based programs.

Remittance-based programs include information on how to send money through various formal channels, the transaction costs in using different

services, as well as information on the importance of sending through established formal remittance channels. Government banks in some Asian countries have encouraged migrants to send their remittances through formal channels to better monitor the flow of money into the economy. There are some examples of remittance-based programs conducted by migrant countries of origin, for example the Philippines and Nepal. In the Philippines, the central bank has encouraged commercial banks to provide migrant workers information on opening bank accounts to access cheaper, easier and safer money wiring services (Agcaoili, 2016). In Nepal, the national government is campaigning for use of formal remitting services, as an estimated 69% of foreign remittances come through informal channels (Ferrari et al. 2007).

Non-remittance based programs focuses on how to save rather than how to remit. Particularly, it is more important to know how to open the bank accounts, and to understand insurance schemes and payment options. The program also includes financial management, as well as business management. For example, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement

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<sup>2</sup> For more details, see (Murata and Sioson, 2018).

Committee (BRAC), one of the leading microfinance institutions in Bangladesh, provides pre-migration counseling to migrants as part of the migration welfare loans it offers. They also provide trainings for potential migrants to improve their financial inclusion (BRAC 2012).

## 2.8 Good practices for financial literacy programmes<sup>3</sup>

The literature does not provide conclusive evidence that financial literacy programs can greatly affect financial outcomes. This does not mean, however, that financial literacy programs do not have any impact on financial behavior and, as such, should not be conducted. On the contrary, the literature suggests learning from the good practices of others. From the review of the literature, four important points were explained to be considered when designing financial literacy programs: information asymmetry, and the importance of timing, content, and delivery mode.

(1) Information asymmetry: Who should be involved in financial literacy program? Doi et al (2014) conducted a

randomized control trial (RCT) experiment in Indonesia which divided female migrants and family members into four groups: a control group; a group where only the migrant is trained; a group where only a family member is trained; and a group where both migrant and family member are trained. They found out that training both family member and migrant can have significant impacts on financial behavior, knowledge and savings.

(2) Timing: When should we provide the financial literacy programs? Doi et al (2012) suggest it best to be conducted before the migrants leave. Gibson et al (2012) note that after conducting financial literacy seminar on various remittance channels and costs among Pacific Island immigrants in New Zealand, “simple financial education training for migrants can change their knowledge about the costs of remitting and lead them to look around more at prices.” Therefore, on-site training can also be important for migrants.

(3) Content and varied interventions: What should we teach in the financial literacy program? Goal-setting, as

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<sup>3</sup> For more details, see Murata and Sioson (2018).



Carpena et al (2015) note, can influence the take up of financial products, as well as influence future actions regarding financial behavior. They suggest that combining simple strategies such as writing down budget can be adopted to “overcome behavioral barriers such as procrastination and forgetfulness.” In a study by Fiorillo et al (2014) on the Philippines’ CARD Bank clients, they found that goal-setting and frequent reminders made clients much more committed to savings. In addition, sending remittance through mobile phones has become easier, as noted in the study by Bagasao (2013) on the remittance-backed programs in the Philippines. Mobile and internet banking for savings, investment, and business can be part of financial literacy programs.

- (4) Delivery mode: How should we teach the financial literacy program? In terms of style and format of financial literacy programs that can significantly impact financial literacy, results vary. A good style should enable faster and easier take-up of knowledge, and simplify access and facilitate desired

behaviors. Financial literacy programs have been implemented in various formats—from seminars to workshops, to pamphlets and modular formats. In utilizing mass media for financial literacy, a number of innovations combine education and entertainment (i.e., edutainment). One example is *Nuestro Barrio*, a 13-episode telenovela targeted to Latino immigrants, and the first Spanish language show aired in an English network in the US (Spader et al. 2009). The show teaches financial literacy; however, compared with a traditional course or workshop, the topics are integrated into the story line because the telenovela’s educational impact also depends on the number of viewers it attracts. Another example is *Scandal!*, a South African soap opera that incorporated a debt-related story line in 2011 in response to the World Bank’s campaign on financial literacy. In 2013, Berg and Zia conducted an evaluation study of the impacts of the show on improving financial decisions among South Africans. They concluded that the show had “significant and favorable impacts on financial knowledge and behavior, which

highlights the importance of delivery mechanisms in financial education” (Berg and Zia 2013, 24). A similar example is a soap opera called “A course that helps you become a millionaire” televised in Mongolia in 2015 and which became the second-most watched show that year (Enkhbold 2016). This television show, the development of which was assisted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction, banked on the idea that “people get hooked on stories” and used this to teach lessons about protecting themselves through saving and financial planning. According to ADB (Enkhbold 2016), the series attracted a wide audience because “the stories were based on real-life experiences and [were] tied to local culture” making the audience able to identify themselves with the many character types from the drama.

## 2.9 Fintech

New technology will dramatically change the financial literacy and the ways of sending money globally. Cryptocurrency has already been used for sending remittances among some Filipino migrant

workers. Mobile money is also a popular money transfer and payment tool, for example M-PESA in Kenya. For migrants in Japan, a good example of mobile applications for sending money is the Seven Bank which is the internet-based banking system. New technology has been also applied to mobile application for record keeping such as Money Forward. These new financial technologies will significantly contribute to improving the quality of financial literacy for all.

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### 3. International migration and Japan


#### 3.1 Foreign Residents in Japan

International migration for Japan used to be historical issues. However, Japan faces the aging society experiencing a decline in labor force. On the other hand, the number of foreign residents within the country has started increasing for the recent years. In June 2018, the total number of foreign residents in Japan reached to 2.637 million (see Figure 3).

With regard to the nationality of these foreign residents in Japan, China (740,000), Republic of Korea (450,000), Vietnam


(290,000), and the Philippines (260,000) are the major countries of origin (see Figure 4).

**Figure 4. Foreign Residents in Japan, 2018 (in thousand)**



Source : Ministry of International Affairs and Communications. Statistics on Foreign Residents in Japan (在留外国人統計)

**Figure 3. Trends in Foreign Residents in Japan (in thousand)**



Source : Ministry of International Affairs and Communications. Statistics on Foreign Residents in Japan (在留外国人統計)


### 3.2 Main reasons of increasing in foreign workers in Japan

An increase in foreign workers in Japan can be mainly explained by three reasons. First, Japan welcomes more high-skilled migrant workers. Second, since 2013, an improvement in domestic labor market conditions make more permanent foreign residents and their spouses work within the country. Third, more foreign technical intern trainees and foreign students work. In 2018, the share of foreign residents under technical intern training was 10.83%, while that of foreign students was 12.29% (see Figure 5).

### 3.3 New Immigration Policy in Japan

From April 2019, Japan established the revised immigration control law. The Japan's new immigration policy plans to accept about 345 thousand foreign unskilled and semi-skilled laborers for next 5 years (i.e. from April 2019 to March 2024). The new immigration policy divides foreign laborers into two new categories: specific skill no.1 and specific skill no.2. The former category allows 5-year residency with conditions of certain level of Japanese literacy and specific skills Japanese government decided, whereas the latter category allows longer residency and family unification with conditions of higher level of skills. In practice, this

Figure 5. Categories for Foreign Residents in Japan, 2018 (%)



Source: Ministry of International Affairs and Communications. Statistics on Foreign Residents in Japan (在留外国人統計)

category enables foreign laborers to stay in Japan permanently.

Japanese government selected 14 specific skill categories and the maximum number of foreign laborers to be accepted for next 5 years. The quota was allocated mainly for elderly care (60,000), restaurant/food-service industry (53,000), construction (40,000), building cleaning (37,000), agriculture (36,500), food/beverage manufacturing (34,000), accommodation/hotel business (22,000), material industry (21,500), and shipbuilding/marine industry (13,000), fishery (9,000) and other manufacturing industries (see Table 1).

### 3.4 Nationality of foreign residents in Japan

Table 2 lists the top 10 nationality of foreign residents in Japan in 2018. In the class, we discussed some features of them from major countries of origin such as China, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brazil.

(1) Chinese: More than 20,000 Chinese live in Kawaguchi City in Saitama Prefecture. They start creating their own community near from JR Nishi-Kawaguchi Station. We can see Little Chinatown. The reason why many Chinese live here is the good access to Tokyo as well as the newly

**Table 1. Fourteen specific skill categories for foreign laborers**

	Specific Skill	(in Japanese)	for 5 years
1	Elderly care	介護	60000
2	Building Cleaning	ビルクリーニング	37000
3	Material Industry	素形材産業	21500
4	Industrial Machinery Manufacturing	産業機械製造業	5250
5	Electrial/Electronic Information-related	電気・電子情報関連産業	4700
6	Construction	建設業	40000
7	Shipbuilding/Marine Industry	造船・船用業	13000
8	Automobile Meintenance Industry	自動車整備業	7000
9	Aviation	航空業	2200
10	Accomodation/Hotel business	宿泊業	22000
11	Agriculture	農業	36500
12	Fishery	漁業	9000
13	Food/Beverage manufacturing	飲食品製造業	34000
14	Restaurant/Food-service industry	外食業	53000
	<b>Total</b>	<b>合計</b>	<b>345150</b>

Note: The number of foreign laborers for each category was estimated by the government.

refurbished housing complex like Shibazono Danchi. In this housing development, there used to be many conflicts between foreign residents and Japanese ones, particularly about the garbage collection due to the lack of communication. Nowadays, the better communication has been built between the communities, and the notices for residences have been shown in Chinese as well. Many Chinese also live in urban areas such as the eastern districts of Tokyo and the Yokohama Chinatown.

(2) Korean: Most of Korean live in Tokyo and Osaka areas. There are more than 20,000 Korean living in Ikuno-ku, Osaka. The second largest city is Shinjyuku-ku, Tokyo where a famous

Koreatown is located. This shows that the job opportunities in urban areas attract Koreans living in Japan.

(3) Vietnamese: Many Vietnamese live in the places with a good access to Tokyo areas such as Funabashi City (3,140) and Matsudo City (2,268) in Chiba Prefecture, and Kawaguchi City (3,076) in Saitama Prefecture. Many of them study at Japanese language schools.

(4) Filipino: More Filipinos in Japan tend to live in several prefectures in central Japan such as Aichi, Gifu, and Mie. Most of them are females who used to work as an entertainer. The rest of them work under technical intern trainee program mainly as an agricultural

**Table 2. Top 10 Nationality of foreign residents in Japan**

Top10	Nationality	No. of Foreign Residents in Japan	Share (%)
1	Chinese	741,656	28.1
2	Korean	452,701	17.2
3	Vietnamese	291,494	11.1
4	Filipino	266,803	10.1
5	Brazilian	196,781	7.5
6	Nepalese	85,321	3.2
7	Taiwanese	58,456	2.2
8	American	56,834	2.2
9	Indonesian	51,881	2.0
10	Thai	51,003	1.9

Source: Ministry of International Affairs and Communications. Statistics on Foreign Residents in Japan (在留外国人統計) (June 2018)



worker. Also, there are many Filipino females who received spouse visas.

(5) Brazilian: Many Brazilian in Japan live in places where famous Japanese manufacturing firms such as Toyota City (6,464) in Aichi, Hamamatsu City (3,842) in Shizuoka, and Suzuka City (3,287) in Mie. Brazilian people in Japan also live in the Northern Kanto district which is a core manufacturing area of Japan. In this area, some famous Japanese manufacturing firms such as Subaru Corporation and Panasonic Corporation have assembly factories. In the late 1980s, there was the lack of labor force in factories. Thus, after 1990 when the revised immigration control law was issued, the long-term visas for Brazilian factory workers have been given to fulfil the labor demand of the manufacturing industry. Nowadays, Oizumi village, the smallest village in Gunma Prefecture, is regarded as a Brazil Town with 4,395 Brazilian residents.

### 3.5 Some key issues on Japanese future immigration policies

In the class, we discussed the following six major concerns on Japan's immigration policies: (a) Japanese firms have low labor productivity; (b) Japanese employers regard foreign workers as cheap labor; (c) there is the mismatch between labor demand (Japanese employers) and labor supply (foreign workers); (d) Japanese policy makers have poor management of the expected number of foreign workers; (e) Japanese government leaves all the work to employers and local government units (e.g. compulsory language support); (f) Japan's future immigration policies should not deteriorate Japan's fiscal conditions (e.g. the quantity of tax revenue, and the quality of medical care and social security benefit).

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# Chapter 2

## 1. Actual Cases Analysis and Lessons

### 1.1. Country of Origin and Destination Perspectives: The Philippines and Qatar

*Mariri Nino*

This section will address the issue of labor migration and development through comparing countries of origin and countries of destination perspectives with an aim to understand the topics within the current political frameworks and its consequences in the future.


Workers (OFWs) and is renowned for its well-managed labour migration programme. Since 2011, it has deployed an average of 1.8 million workers per year. Figure 1 shows the top 10 destination countries. At the top of the list are Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar. However, an increasing trend is apparent in Asian countries such as Hong Kong with a 24% increase from 2016 to 2017.

#### I. Background

*Country of Origin - A profile of Migration in the Philippines: Managing Migration For Development*

The Philippines is Asia's biggest supplier of labor with 10.48 million Overseas Filipino

**Figure 1. Top 10 Destinations Countries of OFWs**



Source : Managing Migration for Development (Imson, Lecture, Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University, October 23, 2019)

**Table 1. Push and Pull Factors of Migration From the Philippines**

Push	Pull
Limited domestic economic opportunities	Growing aging population creating demands for care and domestic workers.
Institutionalization of migration through state extensive legal frameworks.	High salaries, better living standards and the positive effects of remittances on families.
	Strong migrant community networks

Source: Adapted from Managing Migration for Development (Imson, Lecture, Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University, October 23, 2019)

### Push and Pull Factors


Table 1 elucidates the various factors that guide OFWs in their decision to migrate. Some push factors include limited domestic economic opportunities and the institutionalised migration management schemes whereas pull factors include the growing demand for care and domestic work, high salaries and remittances, and strong migrant diasporas in many of the destination countries. A major force driving many Filipinos to pursue labor migration lies in the culture around it - the perceived lack of lucrative domestic job opportunities and the social value placed on overseas employment leading to a better life.

### *Country of Destination - A Profile of Migration in Qatar*

The gulf countries are unique grounds for migration given that around half of the population are migrants and Qatar is no exception with around 65% (Figure 2). This is largely due to the discovery of oil in the

70s and the following construction booms and the consequent influx of migrant workers.

**Figure 2. Percentage of Migrants in GCC countries, 2017**



Source : 2019 Situation Report on International Migration in the Arab States (forthcoming 2019), UN ESCWA

## II. Migration Policy and System

### *Labor Migration Management by the Filipino Government*

#### History


The government involvement in matters of migration began in 1974 when it was institutionalised under the Labor Code of the Philippines - PD442. This was the wake of such government-managed placement programs as the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), National Seamen Board (NSB), later Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) replacing many private recruitment agencies (Ruiz, 2008). The current system is a result of reforms in 1955 which placed paramount importance on the protection of Overseas Filipinos above finding employment through its Magna Carta of Overseas Filipino Workers (RA804). Recently, in 2019 a new bill was introduced for the establishment of the Overseas Filipino Department separate from the Ministry of Labor.

#### Policy Agenda and Strategies of Migration Management

The Philippine migration policy assures the protection of workers and only employs OFWs to "countries where the rights of Filipino migrant workers are protected" (Sec. 4, RA8042). It practices three major strategies for a successful migration program; 1) protection of workers in all

phases of the migration cycle, 2) private sector involvement, 3) emphasis on the value of international cooperation. Figure 4 shows the migration cycle and a summary of governmental efforts to support OFWs and left-behind families. During the pre-arrival stage, OFWs go through orientations on workers' rights, standard employment contracts, and medical examinations provided by the government. Special attention is placed on the enhanced private sector participation, particularly recruitment agencies who are seen as "partners in development." In the Philippines, recruiters are held accountable for the payment of employees when employers fail to do so. This joint liability holds these partnered agencies accountable and OFWs are less susceptible to corrupt employers abroad. Post arrival orientation and Services of the Philippine Overseas Labour Office (POLO) ensure workers' safety during employment. All throughout the cycle, ratifications of international conventions, Bilateral Agreements, and Memorandum of Understanding are stressed as important frameworks to facilitate successful migration. It is one way to involve all stakeholders in managing irregular migration, address market needs and enhance political mileage.

**Figure 3. Government Involvement in the Migration Cycle**



Source : Managing Migration for Development (Imson, Lecture, Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University, October 23, 2019)

### Challenges and Issues

While impressive, Philippine's migration policy leaves some questions. Although complete in its efforts to protect workers' rights, issues such as illegal recruitment and trafficking, contract violations, lack of employment mobility and verbal and physical abuse at the workplace are prevalent owing to a high percentage of OFWs vulnerability. Figure 4 shows the effect of migration - especially on women - which creates precarious working environments leading to feelings of vulnerability according

to a 2016 report by the Department of Foreign Affairs. This could be due to the lack of legal measures to assure domestic workers - predominantly undertaken by females - the safety that they would need abroad as they are exempt from labor laws.

### *Labor Migration Management by the Qatar Government*

#### The Kafala System

Many of the migrant workers are employed through the Kafala system unique to Qatar. It is a sponsorship program where a migrant worker agency is significantly limited. It is defined as a system which ties employers (sponsors) to migrant workers for:

1. Entry to the country of destination;
2. Issuance and renewal of residence and work permit;
3. termination of employment;
4. transfer to a different employer;
5. exit from the country of destination.

The Kafala system has been a topic of contestation for its exploitive measures under Western media. Qatar announced the abolishment of the need for exit permits for

**Figure 4. The percentage of vulnerability for Overseas Filipino Workers, 2016.**



Source : Managing Migration for Development (Imson, Lecture, Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University, October 23, 2019)

migrant workers and the need for a non-objection certificate (NOC). Migrants can now transfer jobs, after the term of the contract or five years in the case of the undefined period in a contract, without having to seek permission from their sponsors.

### Challenges and Issues

Despite recent changes to the Kafala system, change has been a slow process. The Kafala system still applies to those working in oil and gas sectors, domestic workers and top management personnel - leaving these groups of laborers very vulnerable. (fact check). Amidst much international backlash, around 86% of the public showed a desire to either maintain or strengthen the Kafala system in a national survey as shown in Figure 5.

The sentiments towards the Kafala system are surprising at first but upon further

inspection, in a country with majority migrant populations, such imbalanced systems may form naturally to counter and exercise control over migrant workers. However, this is not to say that these systems should be practiced. The issue lies in realising an ethical and balanced recruitment style that will cause the least resistance from the domestic population. Another reason for wanting to keep the sponsorship system is due to a high number of foreign domestic workers. Because domestic work is perceived as private and exclusive to one family at a time, the dismantling of the kafala system can be constructed as a threat to the privacy and intimacy of national households.

**Figure 5. Public Attitudes towards the Kafala System in Qatar.**

### PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO KAFALA

*“Should kafala be changed to make the foreign workers more dependent on their sponsor, less dependent on their sponsor, kept about the same, or totally eliminated?”*

56% of the respondents said the system should be maintained unchanged;

12% responded that foreign workers should be made less dependent on their sponsors; and

30% expressed the opposite opinion that legislation should make them more dependent on their sponsors.


Source : Country of Destination Perspective (Tunon, Lecture, Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University, October 9, 2019)

### III. Case Studies

#### *Case Study 1: Effects of Remittances in the Philippines*

In the Philippines, remittances make up around 10% of the national GDP. Figure 6 shows that remittances have been on the rise since the 90s and have seen remarkable growth within the last decade.

**Figure 6. OFWs Cash Remittances from 1979 to 2015**



Source : Managing Migration for Development (Imson, Lecture, Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University, October 23, 2019)

The social benefits of receiving remittances are felt immediately by family members when they can spend more on education, acquisition of property and goods. Figure 7 shows how remittances are spent in OFW households. A significant portion is spent on educational (70%) and medical (55%) expenses to better their living conditions.

The positive effects of remittances are numerous but the downside of transnational families caused by migration is re-configured

family arrangements and possible detrimental effects on children.


#### *Case Study 2: Human Rights Violations in the making of 2022 FIFA Qatar*

Around 5,000 migrant workers staged peaceful strikes on August 4 and 5th, after they had been refused remuneration for four months. They worked for Iskan and Tashgeel - construction companies for the 2022 FIFA world cup.

Aside from refusing payment, workers faced poor living conditions and were refused the required letters that would allow them to switch employers and renew their work permits. According to one of the migrants employed at Iskan, "we protested for six hours to demand our rights and salaries that amount to 1,200 Qatari riyals (\$329) a month."

An investigation was launched after the protests where it was announced that the majority of workers' salaries were paid in full. It was revealed that negative cash flow caused by non-payments elsewhere in the supply chain caused remuneration delays in both of the companies.

Figure 7. Type of Expenditure of Remittances in percentage, 2007, 2010, 2016.



Source: Managing Migration for Development (Imson, Lecture, Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University, October 23, 2019)

#### IV. The Future of Countries of Origin and Destination

##### *The Future of Philippine Migration*

The Philippines, as the biggest supplier of migrant labor in Asia faces challenges as more and more countries, including Japan, will be outsourcing foreign workers to fill the labor shortage. The big question for the government is whether to continue promoting the deployment of workers overseas. In ensuring the protection of workers, interventionist policies may deter the agency of Filipino workers to freely explore diverse employment options. Striking a balance between greater mobility of migrants with access to labor protection is a topic of contestation for the Philippines.

The issue of brain drain is also a national concern as many leave the country to find work outside of the country. However, our

guest lecturer and past deputy minister of labor and administrator of POEA and OWWA in the Philippines, Mr. Manuel G. Imson stressed the importance of reintegration. What he means is it is vital for labor migrants who will have come back with more skills abroad to be able to contribute to the national labor market with their experiences. Instead of conceptualising the deployment of Filipino workers abroad as brain drain, in this way, it can be understood as more of a brain gain. Therefore, frameworks for integration is also a big issue to be discussed in the future.

##### *The Future of Qatar Migration*

Measures to increase national interest in private industries that are staffed usually with migrants are being taken. The Gulf 2030 Vision indicates a broad plan towards a more nationalized labor market. Nationalization measures such as reservation of jobs, taxing



employers who hire migrants and subsidising those who hire nationals, investments in national education and measures to increase female labor force participation are in place.

However, the challenge lies in transforming a labor regime that has relied heavily on migrant labor and to incentivise nationals to work in private sectors. According to the National Center for Statistics and Information, 76% of Omani youth seeking a job preferred jobs in public sectors over private sectors even if salaries were 50% higher in 2016. On the other hand, employers who have hired cheap labor abroad will likely choose migrants over nationals because they will value cost-effectiveness over training and hiring highly skilled workers. A focus on skills and mobility may generate fewer migrants which in turn will raise wages and possibly working conditions. However, this is not to underestimate the large revenue streams created in both origin and destination countries due to a great number of temporary migrant workers.

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## 1.2. Migration in EU: Case of Brexit

*Akira Murata*

### 1.2.1 EU's Migration History: from emigration to immigration

Until the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Europe was characterised by substantial emigration to the rest of the world. Between 1815 and 1930, around 50 million Europeans moved to the USA, Canada, Australia, Brazil, and Argentina (Ferenczi and Wilcox, 1929).

In 1960, the number of international migrants living in Europe was around 14.4 million (or 3.5% of the total population). Then, in 2013, migrants into Europe reached

52.3 million (or 10.3% of the total population). This increasing inflows of migrants into Europe was primarily driven by changes in individual countries' immigration policies. These policy changes linked with the process of decolonization or to active labor recruitment due to lack of young labor force.

In the class, EU's migration history was explained by eight phases through which Europe gradually shifted from being a major source of emigration to becoming a major destination for immigrants after the WWII.

#### (1) Phase 1: Emigration

Europe was shaped by emigration during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, while the Americas were shaped by immigration from Europe. Some 60 million Europeans left for the New World between 1820 and 1914, as industrialisation, wars, and the search for economic opportunity encouraged out-migration.

#### (2) Phase 2: Return

After the WWII, there was a reshuffling of people in order to get the "right" people inside the right borders. Many of those who had been brought to Germany to work went back home to new countries or old countries. As a result, millions of Germans returned to Germany. There was also migration between colonies and mother countries (e.g. France to Algeria, India and the Caribbean to UK).

#### (3) Phase 3: Immigration for Economic Opportunities

Western European nations such as France and Germany became manufacturing powerhouses, producing goods such as auto mobiles. There were more jobs than workers in France and Germany. On the other hand, there were more workers than jobs in Italy and Spain. Thus, employers asked their governments to allow them to recruit foreign workers. This resulted in the high demand on foreign labor in Europe. In Germany, the foreign workers were termed "Gastarbeiter," which means guest workers in English. This term stresses that they were temporary workers, not immigrants. The government assumed that if employers still needed them after 2-year period of contract, guest workers would return to their countries of origin with savings and be replaced by fresh recruits. Most of guest workers recruited in the 1960s and 1970s worked in factories. However, due to the oil shocks during the 1970s, these recruitment industries restructured between 1970s and 1980s, and many of them who lost jobs had a hard time finding new ones.

#### (4) Phase 4: Economic boom in Europe

In reality, many employers and guest workers wanted to prolong their stays because they could build the win-win situation. Some employers did not want

to send experienced foreign workers back home, while the young guest workers quickly adapted to their life abroad and did not want to return because of lower wages and joblessness in their home countries, for example Italy, Greece, and other poorer economies.

(5) Phase 5: Migrant's rights and family unification

Guest workers gained the right to change jobs and have their families join them with longer stays in their destination countries. This made the population of foreigners increase greater than the number of foreign workers.

(6) Phase 6: Expanding the recruitment

With a lack of supplies of guest workers from Greece, Italy and Spain, the host countries (e.g. France and Germany) looked further afield for guest workers to Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Morocco.

(7) Phase 7: Oil Shocks in the 1970s

Most European nations stopped the recruitment of guest workers from 1973 and 1974, when oil price hikes induced recessions and the restructuring of manufacturing-based economies. European government did not force guest workers to leave, even if they lost their jobs. They were collecting welfare benefits. France and Germany offered bonuses to settled migrants who left, but most guest workers knew that economic

conditions were even worse at their home economies and decided to stay.

(8) Phase 8: Integration

European nations today are struggling to integrate these guest workers and their family and children. Unemployment rates for them are two or three times higher than the rate of natives.

### 1.2.2 Migration Policies and EU Enlargement

New immigration policies and EU enlargement increased the share of newly arrived non-EU foreigners with higher skills. Central Europeans tended to fill low-skilled jobs in EU countries (e.g. Poles in Germany and UK).

When it comes to EU enlargement, a core principle of the EU is quite important to understand, which is "freedom of movement." "Freedom of movement" means that a citizen of an EU member state may travel to another EU member state and work there on an equal basis with natives. In 1985, the Schengen Agreement was signed. This abolished internal border controls within Europe's Schengen Area. In 1999, this was incorporated into European Union Law, excluding Ireland and the UK. In Schengen Area, European member states have officially abolished passport and all other types of border control at their mutual borders.

### 1.2.3 EU enlargement and Brexit


The number of EU member states had increased. In 2004, the EU added 10 member states from central Europe. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania newly joined the EU. Then, in 2013, Croatia joined it, resulting in 28 EU member states. However, on 23 June 2016 the British people voted for the decision on whether the UK should leave or remain in the EU. The decision to leave the EU won by 52% to 48%. Based on the national vote, the UK decided to leave from EU (i.e., Brexit). The then British prime minister, Theresa May, was against Brexit during a public vote (known as a referendum) campaign but changed to be in favour of it because she said that the British people want to see a reduction in immigration. Then, she committed to getting net migration (i.e. the gap between outmigration and immigration) down to a “sustainable level,” which is defined as being below 100,000

people a year. This sustainable level of net migration would not be a reasonable target as the British economy has heavily depended on the international migration for a long term (see Figure 1).

In the case of UK, there was a dramatic increase in EU migrants into the UK from 2012 and 2015. Among EU nationals who migrated to the UK, the survey revealed that the majority of them migrated because of jobs.

Even though the British government concluded that the migrants were economically beneficial, the backlash against “too much migration” prompted the UK and other EU governments to deny “Freedom of Movement” to Bulgarian and Romanian workers after these countries joined the EU. Immigration was a major issue in May 2010 elections that brought a new coalition

Figure 1. Migration Trends in UK, 2007-2017



Source: ONS


BBC

Conservative-Liberal Democrat government to power. It pledged to reduce net annual migration from 242,000 in 2010 to less than 100,000 by 2015.

The UK used to enjoy economic benefits from immigration. The labor government elected in 1997 expanded immigration to bolster the country's economic growth. Between 1997 and 2009, the net migration to the UK was 2.2 million, which is equivalent to an average 183,000 immigrants annually.

However, with the growing opposition to immigration, the labor government introduced a five-tier entry system to reduce the influx and rationalize the immigration system in 2007. This new entry system collapsed past 80 entry doors to 5 tiers. Thus, non-EU foreigners coming to work in the UK are divided into the following 5 tiers: high value (Tier1); skilled (Tier2); unskilled (Tier 3); students (Tier4); temporary (Tier5). This is important to note that Tier3 (unskilled) are not in use under this entry system (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2. UK's Five-Tier Entry Points Based System**



Source:

<https://www.freemovement.org.uk/uk-politicians-australian-style-immigration-system/>

With regard to the seasonal migration, particularly to meet the demand from agricultural industries in the UK, the seasonal agricultural workers scheme (SAWS) was established in 1945 as a cultural exchange scheme to encourage young, predominantly agricultural, students from across Europe to work in agriculture during the peak seasons. This exchange scheme was modified over time and became a quota-based system in 1990. From 2004 to 2007, under this exchange scheme, most of seasonal agricultural workers came from the following countries: Ukraine (33%); Bulgaria (23%); Russia (15%); Romania (11%); Belarus (9%); and Moldova (6%). The SWAS was closed in 2013, with an annual quota of 5,500 workers. The closer of the SWAS was mainly because of the wider ambition of the UK government to cut net migration drastically and break the link between temporary and permanent migration. The government assumes that particularly the British

workforce would begin to fill these labor force shortages as the low-skill Tier 3 of the points-based system remains closed.<sup>4</sup>

#### 1.2.4 A UK's New Points-Based Immigration System

The UK formally left the EU on 31 January 2020, but there is still a lot of negotiation during the transition period, which is due to end on 31 December 2020. The British government has revealed a new immigration system to replace "Freedom of Movement" as the UK has left the EU. Under the new system, EU migrants will be treated the same as those from the rest of the world.

According to the policy statement by the government on 19 February 2020, to get a visa, applicants from anywhere in the world meet the following conditions: (1) to have a job offer (20 points) from an "approved employer" at an "appropriate skill level" (20 points); and (2) to speak English (10 points). This means that applicants with job offers for selected skills and English language skills will get 50 points. However, they must have 70 points to be eligible for a visa.

Extra points can be gained from earning at least £ 25,600 (20 points). This earning threshold was reduced from the £ 30,000 which currently applies to non-EU applicants. In addition, even if they do not earn as much salary, the British government give extra

points for those having better qualifications (10 points for a relevant PhD; or 20 points for a PhD in science, technology, engineering or mathematics) or those with an offer of a job in which the UK has a shortage (20 points).

One of the important issues to be explained is that the British government wants to encourage labour with the selected talent and reduce the levels of immigrants coming to the UK with low skills. The government seems to think that the jobs for low skilled migrants can be met by eight million economically inactive potential workers within the country.

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<sup>4</sup> For more details, see Consterdine and Samuk (2015)

### 1.3. Migration in the destination countries of Singapore, Republic of Korea, and Japan

Reiko Ando

The following section will be focusing on the migration policies in the advanced Asian economies of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore. This section will explore different policies that are implemented in order to allow for the migration of foreign workers. As the three nations are economically powerful, they are appealing destination countries with possibilities for higher wages and a better quality of life. The three nations are all differing in their approaches, but they all face the issue of labour shortages within their nation in particular, with jobs regarding manual labour.

In order to present an idea of three nations, the statistics are compiled into Table 1. There are common features of migration in Asian countries which are listed below:

- I. Controlling demand: work permit, quota and levy scheme (as seen in Singapore, and the Republic of Korea)
- II. Transience and disposability: In the case of unskilled workers in Singapore
- III. Recruitment Industry: Mostly common in Singapore where there is less government integration
- IV. Gendered migration policy

- V. Ethnicised migration policy: Japan's immigration policy for Nikkei Brazilians in the 1980's
- VI. Educationally channeled migration policy: Japan's foreign technical intern trainees (外国人技能実習生)

**Table 1: Profile of the Republic of Korea and Singapore**

Item	Japan	Rep of Korea	Singapore
Population million 2014	127.0	50.4	5.5
Population growth rate %	-	0.5	2.7
Labour force (millions) 2014	65.3	26.4	3.1
Unemployment rate % 2014 labour force	3.7	3.5	1.9 (2015)
Age dependency ratio (% of working age pop, 2014)	63.0	37.0	36.9
Per capita GNI current US\$ 2014	42,000	27,090	55,150
GDP growth annual 2011-14 in %	0.7	3.0	4.2
Immigrant stock thousands	2,437	1,232	2,323
As % of population	1.9	2.5	43.0

Source : Compiled from Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016 (World Bank, 2016). Adapted from "Migration Policy in the Republic of Korea and Singapore" by Wickramasekara, 2016. Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University.

The next section will be summarising the immigration policies for migrant workers in Singapore, Republic of Korea, and then Japan.

## I. Singapore

### Introduction

Singapore achieved independence from Britain in 1965 and underwent an economic miracle from then on. It was one of the poorest countries during the 1960's, but in modern day it is one of the most advanced economies globally. Migrant workers have long been an asset for Singapore's economy, as they depend on these workers to fill the gaps of the labour shortage. The shortages in labour triggered the opening of doors to allow for more immigration in 1978 from China and 'non-traditional sources' (NTS) countries such as Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and so forth. Due to this, 30% of

Singapore's workforce is foreign, and it is said to have the largest foreign working population in Asia (Huang & Yeoh, 2003), and increased up to 38% in 2015. Singapore aims for a class-based migration policy to attract immigrants of different skills since the 1960s. Table 2 compiles the statistics of the foreign labour force, and the share of the foreign labour force to the Singaporean labour force.

### Overview of foreign workforce and immigration in Singapore

The demand for foreign workers in Singapore is numerous, including the labour shortage for low and semi-skilled workers. The native residents do not want to work in 3D jobs (Dirty, Difficult, Dangerous) even at times of recession. Since Singapore is a developed nation, the females are educated and have the desire to focus on their careers, and so this creates a strong demand for domestic migrant workers to look after the housework and child-rearing. As with many advanced nations, Singapore is experiencing an ageing population and increases the demand for elderly care workers.

**Table 2: Labour and share of foreign labour force**

Year	Labour force (1,000s)	Foreign (Non-resident) labour force (1,000s)	Share of foreign (Non/resident) labour force %
2006	2,594.1	713.3	27.5
2009	3,030.0	1,044.3	34.5
2010	3,135.9	1,088.6	34.7
2015	3,610.6	1,378.3	38.2
2019	3,778	1,399.6	37.04

Source : Adapted from Statistical Table: Labour Force (Ministry of Manpower, 2019)



The Immigration policy in Singapore has the following features:

- A) Classes of non-resident foreign manpower
- B) Administrative and legal frameworks for managing foreign manpower
- C) Specific policies targeting semi-skilled foreign workers
- D) Pathways of professional, skilled and semi-skilled foreigners
- E) Integration of immigrants and emigrants into the Singapore society

The current foreign workforce numbers have been compiled from the Singapore’s Ministry of Manpower:

As shown in Table 3, the foreign workforce population was increasing from 2014 to 2016 where it experienced a peak in the total foreign workforce and started to decrease. However, in 2019 it increased one again, with the highest total foreign workforce population in June 2019.

There are different pathways for professional, semi-skilled and unskilled migrant workers in Singapore. These pathways are detailed below (Rahman, 2017):

**Table 3: Foreign Workforce Statistics**

Pass Type	Dec 2014	Dec 2015	Dec 2016	Dec 2017	Dec 2018	Jun 2019
Employment Pass (EP)	178,900	187,900	192,300	187,700	185,800	189,000
S Pass	170,100	178,600	179,700	184,400	195,500	197,800
Work Permit (Total)	991,300	997,100	992,700	965,200	972,600	981,000
Work Permit (Foreign Domestic Worker)	222,500	231,500	239,700	246,800	253,800	255,800
Work Permit (Construction)	322,700	326,000	315,500	284,900	280,500	284,300
Total Foreign Workforce	1,355,700	1,387,300	1,393,000	1,368,000	1,386,000	1,399,600

Source : Adapted from Budget 2019 [Ebook] (Government of Singapore, 2019)

## 1. Professional and skilled migrants in Singapore




Source: Employment Permit System (EPS) in Republic of Korea (Cho, Lecture, Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University, October, 2019)

Note: From those that are EP and S-Pass-holders (total: 340,000 in 2017), a small number are offered Singaporean Permanent Residence (SPR) or citizenship.

## 2. Unskilled migrant workers

- Unskilled Foreign Workers: they are often entering into Singapore on a temporary and circular basis
- They are permanently transient within the nation

## 3. Semi-skilled migrant workers



Source: Employment Permit System (EPS) in Republic of Korea (Cho, Lecture, Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University, October, 2019)

## Immigration Policies for foreign workers (Skilled and Unskilled workers)

There is a *dual policy* that can be seen, in regard to skilled and unskilled workers. Singapore's policies make clear distinctions between skilled migration and low skilled migration. The skilled migrant workers are in an advantageous position where they can access rights such as family unification, with the potential to transition to a citizenship. Whereas the low skilled migrant workers appear more like temporary workers by the economy and employers. They are only able to work in certain sectors, and do not have the benefits mentioned above for skilled workers.

In terms of the immigration policies in Singapore, it is a rather top-down approach. The government is authoritarian, so controls most aspects of the immigration policies and this can be seen through the prioritisation of recruitment for foreign workers for the economy. The Singaporean economy focuses on the recruitment of low-skilled workers to compensate for the labour shortages for the 3D jobs. The recruitment of these migrant workers are based dominantly for economic reasons and so places the recruitment in the hands of the employers. The Ministry of Manpower is able to control the recruitment process through an employer levy for each worker, in relation to the demand for each sector. The less skilled that a worker is, the levy is higher in order to increase the dependency. The workers' contracts are

decided between the worker and employer. There are recruitment agencies that are involved, and yet they are often exploiting the migrants with expensive fees and inaccurate information.

#### Policies for semi-skilled immigrant workers

In reference to semi-skilled immigrant workers, there are several policies in place applicable to them which are listed below:

- A) Selection of migrant workers
- B) Approved source countries and sectors of economy
- C) Foreign worker levy
- D) Employment agency
- E) Responsibility of employers
- F) Termination of contract and work permit

#### Singapore's migration policy in the context of global South

Singapore's achievement in controlling immigration sets an example for other countries in Asia, due to their efficient utilisation of their foreigner workforce

How Singapore controls the inflow of migrants:

- Sector or industry level quota: dependency ceiling e.g. 87.5% maximum ceiling for construction workers (Budget 2019, 2019)
- Different work permits based on income levels which have different rights

- Security bond for work permit holders: An employer must pay a \$5000 bond on each worker that will be taken in case of violation of work permit conditions
- Pregnancy testing of female domestic workers carried out on a 6 months basis: They will be deported if positive
- No minimum wage for work permit holder: decided between employer and employee
- Increased immigration restrictions after the 2011 elections by raising fees and levies

#### Consequences

- Low wages and high recruitment costs lead to high debt burdens
- Limited right to union activity and public demonstrations, in fear of deportation
- Specific problems of female domestic workers: cases of sexual abuse, mistreatment, and poor mental health

#### Ratifying Migrant Rights Conventions

The human rights instruments of the United Nations and ILO Core Conventions are put into place to protect the rights of migrant workers globally. Singapore has yet to sign the three migrant-specific international conventions that pledge to uphold these rights which are: the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant

Workers and Their Families 1990, the ILO Convention on Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions 1975 No. 143), and the ILO Convention on Migration for Employment 1949 (No. 97). As Singapore focuses on the economic benefits that can be obtained through migrant workers, they should show commitment to protecting the rights of these workers. However, Singapore is not the only nation that has yet to sign these conventions, another is South Korea which the next section will be exploring.

## II . Republic of Korea

### Introduction

Another miracle economic country like Singapore, the Republic of Korea (RoK) has become one of the most advanced economies in the world through rapid economic development after the Korean War. Currently, it is a democratic nation with its largest industry in the services and industrial sectors. Currently the RoK faces similar issues with Singapore and Japan, which is the issue of an ageing population that inevitably leads to labour shortages. This creates a demand for an increase in foreign workers, particularly in the same pattern as Singapore, where the locals are reluctant to perform 3D jobs. A prominent difference in the immigration policies between Singapore and RoK, is that Singapore's immigrant workers are left in the hands of the private sector whereas RoK is heavily monitored by the government.

In 1993, the Industrial Trainee System which was modelled by the Japanese employment and training system. However, this proved to create many issues such as the distortion of the domestic industrial structure, human rights violations against foreign workers, and general corruption surrounding the entire process. Therefore, with the increasing pressure to change these policies, a new system of the Employment Permit System (EPS) was created and introduced in August 2004. The enactment of the EPS was through signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with 16 countries including Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, East Timor, and Indonesia, etc. The EPS enabled certain industries such as agriculture, fisheries, construction, and manufacturing to hire immigrant workers under a specific quota per business. In addition, the two common EPS visas include the E9 visa (non-professional employment) and the H2 visa (working visit, mostly ethnic Koreans from China) which was added to the EPS later in 2007.

## The EPS overview and Statistics

The Basic Principles for the system is listed below:

- A) Rules for transparency for selection, important and sojourn support
- B) Rules to prevent distorting of domestic industrial structure
- C) Rules to protect native employment
- D) Rules to prevent discrimination between Koreans and foreigners
- E) Rules to prevent long-term settlement of non-professional workers


This enactment of the new system allows companies that are experiencing difficulties in hiring domestic workers to legally hire foreign workers (unskilled workers) based accordingly to the size of the industry.

## Summary of the aims of the EPS system

- A) Protection of native employment
- B) Fill the shortage of 3D related job
- C) To prevent sending-related corruption and ensure transparency of the selection process

Operational Organisation: The Foreign Workforce Policy Committee are the top decision makers in the process of these policies, and consists of 20 members. They analyse the supply and demand trends of domestic workers yearly and make decisions based on the size of foreign workers with the relevant industries, and selects the sending countries. Those involved include the Vice Minister of Finance and Economy, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Vice Minister of Justice, Vice Minister of Commerce, Vice Minister of Industry and Energy, Vice Minister of Employment and Labor, Vice Minister of SMEs (small to midsize enterprise) and start-ups and other Vice Ministers of central administrative agencies.

Figure 1: Statistics of Admission of Worker under the EPS



Source: Based on figures supplied by the Ministry of Labour and Employment (ROK) to ILO. Adapted from "Migration Policy in the Republic of Korea and Singapore" by Wickramasekara, 2016. Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University.

As shown in Figure 1, although the EPS entrants can differ drastically, there is a general trend of an increase in the number of foreigners that enter the nation under the EPS. The government tends to restrict the quota depending on external circumstances such as during an economic recession in order to protect the Korean nationals.

**Act on the Foreign Workers Employment (International Labour Organization, 2003)**

I. Article: Purpose

- Steady supply and demand for human resources
- Sustainable development of the national economy by monitored introduction and management of foreign workers

II. Article 2: Definition of a foreign worker

- "Refers to a person who does not have the nationality of the Republic of Korea and works or intends to work in a business or workplace located in the Republic of Korea for the purpose of earning wage"

III. Article 3: Scope of Application

- Applies to foreign workers and businesses and employers that hire immigrant workers
- Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the entry into, sojourn in, and the departure from the Republic of Korea of foreign workers shall be governed by the immigration Act

**Table 4: Designation of sending countries for small-scale industries**

Industry	Country
Construction	Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, Myanmar, Sri Lanka
Agriculture/Livestock	Nepal, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar
Fishery	Indonesia, Vietnam, East Timor, Sri Lanka, the Philippines
Service	Mongolia, Uzbekistan

Source: Employment Permit System (EPS) in Republic of Korea (Cho, Lecture, Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University, October, 2019)

Allowable number of foreign workers (Cho, 2019)

The EPS is based on allocating the allowable number of foreign workers depending on the size of the business. The allowable number of foreign workers are based on factors such as:

- A) Total of those insured in the manufacturing and service industry
- B) Total amount of construction in the construction industry
- C) Total size of farm in agriculture and livestock industry
- D) Total number of ships in the fishery industry
- E) Total size of area in the fish culture industry

If there are cases of higher labor shortages than average (particularly in the manufacturing industry) or those that are SMEs under 300 employees, they are able to get 120% of the quota. In addition, if the EPS also generates native employment then those companies are able to hire more foreign workers. In regards to the point system for businesses, in the past, businesses would

have a first come first served basis. However, businesses are now given scores based on the different criteria, and those that have the highest scores will be prioritised in the foreign workforce allocation. The RoK also allocates the preferred nationalities of immigrants based on the industry which can be seen in the Table 4.

#### Process of the EPS for immigrant workers

The process of those eligible for the EPS is outlined below:

1. Test of proficiency in Korean (TOPIK), skills test, and competency test
2. Medical check-up for successful candidates
3. Job application: Job seekers will work closely with sending agencies
4. Signing of the labour contract
5. Pre-departure training: learning about the Korean culture
6. Visa application and insurance
7. Entry of workers in RoK
8. Employment training and workers' delivery
9. Sojourn support
10. Return support

Eligible applicants of the TOPIK must be between the ages of 18 to 39 years. They should have no criminal record and have no record of illegal stay in RoK. They should also not be restricted from the departure of their home country.

RoK allows for the re-entry of committed workers through their re-entry system. These see the benefits of being exempt from the EPS-TOPIK and employment training. They would be required to re-enter RoK 3 months after their departure and be allocated into the same company. The eligible industries include agriculture/livestock, fishery, manufacturing businesses that have less than 50 workers (Cho,2019).

#### The Challenges of the EPS and future suggestions

- I. Over 90% of the foreign workers are non-professional, and so various policies for utilising foreign labor is needed.
  - For the future, the government should focus on appealing to highly skilled workers so they can be settled into the Korean society. However, this should be monitored so that the labor market is not dominated by the foreign workforce.
- II. Customisation of the supply and demand system for immigrant workers

- There needs to be an advancement in the workforce introduction system, to allow foreign workers to be matched appropriately to the level of their jobs and the difficulty of their work. This can be done through introducing the National Qualification Framework (NQF) and Sectoral Qualification Framework (SQF).

#### III. Selection of committed workers

- Using the profiling methodology in psychology in the selection process, workers that have high potential for strong commitment and loyalty to companies can be chosen.

#### IV. Dilemma of Korean dream for immigrant workers

- Sending countries demand for an increase in the quota for hiring Korean workers since the immigrant workers can achieve a good living environment, and the nation has a set minimum wage. However, the government aims to protect the Korean workers and their jobs from being overtaken by foreigners.
- A balanced ratio needs to be established between the foreign workers and domestic workers. RoK will continue to face



shortages in their labour force, that can affect the economy negatively if not properly addressed.

### III. Japan


Japan is one of the world's largest economies, that is well-known globally from its delicious cuisine all the way to their traditional tourist destinations across the nation. Although it is currently a nation with economic power, it faces the strikingly dire issue of an ageing population and shrinking workforce. In order to combat this, the government has come up with three plausible solutions: allowing more migrant workers, encouraging more female participation in the workforce, and the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI)

and robots. The Japanese government has started to introduce amendments to the immigration policies in order to attract more foreign workers, in order to fill in the labour shortages.

### The Global and National Trends in Migrants

The global and national trend in Japan of migrants is increasing, as seen by the image below. Since 2014, the number of foreign workers has nearly doubled in Japan. The largest industry where foreigners work is the manufacturing with 29.7% of migrants (see Figure 2). The main reasons for the increase in foreign workers in Japan can be seen to be more highly-skilled migrant workers come to Japan, since 2013 there was development in the domestic labour market conditions that allowed for more permanent residency and

Figure 2: Graphs showing the number of foreign workers in Japan, and their industries



Source: Buchholz, 2020

allowed their spouses to work. Another reason was due to an increase in foreign technical intern trainees (外国人技能実習生) and an increase in foreign students that were working. The Japanese government plans to further increase the inflow of migrants and has made amendments to the immigration and refugee recognition law that was put into action in April 2019. The government planned to accept over 345,000 workers into Japan of foreign unskilled and semi-skilled laborers in the next 5 years, in order to fill the gaps within the shrinking workforce.

With the new revisions, there are 2 distinct categories for foreign laborers:

1. 特定技能 1 号: Specific Skill No.1:  
This allows for a 5 year residency with the requirements of Japanese literacy and specific skills of the industry
2. 特定技能 2 号: Specific Skill No.2 :  
This allows for a longer residency and for family unification, but requires a higher level of required skills. This should allow foreigners to stay permanently.

In addition, there are 14 skills listed by the government that is required for the foreign workers to have with the revision of the immigration law which is shown in Table 5 with the maximum number of foreigners allowed per category.

Table 5: Specific skills for the new immigration law in Japan 2019

	Specific Skill	(in Japanese)	for 5 years
1	Elderly care	介護	60000
2	Building Cleaning	ビルクリーニング	37000
3	Material Industry	素形材産業	21500
4	Industrial Machinery Manufacturing	産業機械製造業	5250
5	Electrial/Electronic Information-related	電気・電子情報関連産業	4700
6	Construction	建設業	40000
7	Shipbuilding/Marine Industry	造船・船用業	13000
8	Automobile Meintenance Industry	自動車整備業	7000
9	Aviation	航空業	2200
10	Accomodation/Hotel business	宿泊業	22000
11	Agriculture	農業	36500
12	Fishery	漁業	9000
13	Food/Beverage manufacturing	飲食料品製造業	34000
14	Restaurant/Food-service industry	外食業	53000
	<b>Total</b>	<b>合計</b>	<b>345150</b>

Source : Migrants' Integration into destination countries: Case in Japan (Uramoto and Murata, Lecture, Migration and Development 2 course, Sophia University, November 20, 2019)

## Overview of Japan's Integration Policies: Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)

Japan has been known to be a destination country for migrants, yet with many difficulties and challenges that come with it such as the language barrier with the Japanese language. Through using the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) to get an overview of Japan's integration of migrants into their society. The MIPEX indicator looks at the following factors of labour market mobility, family reunion, education, health, political participation, permanent residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination. Japan ranks 27 out of 38 OECD countries in 2014 ("Japan | MIPEX 2015", 2020) with a score of 44 that signifies it is halfway favourable. The nation is doing relatively well in regard to labour market mobility (65 out of 100) and family reunion (61 out of 100), in contrast to their worst categories of education (21 out of 100) and anti-discrimination (22 out of 100). In addition, Japan is currently lacking an integration policy on the national level as the government often assigns these tasks to the local governments and ward offices.

These indicators are detailed below:

### I. Labor market access

- Permanent and long-term residents and their families are given the right for employment or self-employment in any sector

- They are also able to use social assistance, along with a few other specific types of visas. However, other visa holders can change their jobs but may not be done easily

### II. Family Reunification

- This is possible, but limited to specific categories of sponsors
- The Immigration Control Bureau has discretion in the family reunion procedure
- The dependents have the right to work for 20 hours per week but can be difficult to access this.

### III. Education

- All foreign children are allowed but not required to attend preschool and compulsory education, also lacks diversity
- Since 2009/10, there has been advancements made in the national curriculum and guidelines to help immigrant pupils attain academic literacy in Japanese
- There are separate private migrant schools such as Zainichi and Brazilian schools

### IV. Public Service Access

- Health services are accessible for legal foreign residents, however there are limited

medical interpreters that can cause communication issues

#### V. Political Participation

- There are no national-level voting rights. Some cities do give foreign residents the local voting rights
- Although Some consultative bodies have been created there is an issue with the output

#### VI. Permanent Residency and Naturalization

- Eligible immigrants face a strict economic requirement to prove enough assets or skills to make an independent living
- Decision to give permanent residency is discretionary and can be rejected. However, if approved they can enjoy equal socio-economic rights
- The application process for naturalization is generally easier but also discretionary

#### VII. Anti-discrimination in Japan

- Japan is extremely low for this category, ranking 37th out of 38 countries according to the MIPEX ("Anti-discrimination | MIPEX 2015", 2020)
- Japanese government has not explicitly given a definition of discrimination


- This gives room for interpretation on what discrimination is, and leaves migrants feeling vulnerable as they are unable to go to court for their case

#### Ageing Japanese Society

Japan's ageing society and shrinking workforce has devastating effects on Japanese society, and the prediction for the sharp decrease in the working-age population is presented in Figure 3. As a diminishing labor workforce decreases the economic growth and GDP of Japan, which has the knock-on effect of lowering the tax revenue. This overall leads to poor social insurance services, and a growing fear of unpaid pensions for Japanese citizens in the future. Japan is moving towards a social-security crisis, as the total public expenditure is increasing whereas the tax revenues are decreasing. The biggest expenditure that will continue to grow is social security particularly covering pensions and medical insurance, with 70% being used for the Japanese population that is aged 65 years and older (Economist, 2010). The current level of social-security benefits can be seen in Figure 4 below, where the forecast for future predictions are also displayed. It can be seen that the social-security benefits will be exceeding above the % of GDP by 2011 and will continue to surpass it well into 2025. Pensions and Medical care welfare will only


continue to increase in cost as the Japanese population continues to age.

**Figure 3 : Working-age population in Japan**



Source:  
 “Into the Unknown, A Special Report on Japan” The Economist

**Figure 4: Japan’s social-security benefits**



Source: “Into the Unknown, A Special Report on Japan” (The Economist, 2010)

### The Concept Of ‘Tabunka Kyosei’ (多文化共生)

Some prefectures that have large foreigner populations have been making progress locally, in order to create the sense of

diversity co-existence between the Japanese citizens and migrant workers. According to statistics published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in 2018 (総務省 在留外国人統計), Tokyo had the highest number of foreign residents in Japan with 21% (555,053) of the overall foreigners (Uramoto Y., Murata A, 2019). The top nationalities include Chinese (28.1%), Korean (17.2%), Vietnamese (11.1%), Filipino (10.1%), and Brazilian (7.5%).

Japan focuses on the notion of Tabunka Kyousei, which was introduced at the end of the 1980s where there was a debate as to whether Japan should allow more foreign workers into the nation. Since then, local governments have stepped in to allow for the assimilation of foreigners into the local prefectures. An example can be seen through Nagoya city, that has a large population of Brazilians working in manufacturing factories. The local government created a policy with the goal for the migrants to not only rely on the government to be supported but to become enablers within the Japanese community. This would be done through communication support and livelihood support to create a more multicultural society. However, this has been criticised as it does not address the existing racism and prejudice that is aimed against minority groups such as Zainichi, Burakumin, and Ryukuan. It also fails to acknowledge that there is diversity within the foreigner population in Japan. In addition, there are

issues with the implementation such as the fact there is no platform where the foreign residents can participate in a political manner as they do not have local voting rights.

#### Further Challenges of Accepting Migrants in Japan

- There is a strong illusion of cultural homogeneity
- Japan must abolish the *German experience* of migration, where guest workers were common for temporary periods of time
- Liberal democracy, civil society and rights groups must get involved in this cause
- There is ambiguity about the success of temporary migration: unclear if migration will lead to naturalisation and permanent settlement

#### Conclusion

It can be seen that the three different destination countries are all different in their approach regarding policies of accepting immigrant workers into their countries. In Singapore, we see that there is less state intervention and more economically driven motives that leaves the migrants livelihoods at the hands of their employers rather than the government. Whereas the Republic of Korea has an established system specifically allocated to migrants and foreign workers, which the government closely monitors and sets the quota per each industry. In Japan, the

government is attempting to attract more foreign workers, although it involves more action in the local prefectures to enforce the idea of a multicultural society. All three countries were experiencing labour shortages, especially in Japan due to their rapidly declining workforce, and a demand for foreign workers, particularly in 3D jobs that locals do not want to perform. However, there were clear issues that need to be addressed, both on the governmental level and the grass-roots level in order to ensure that migrants can attain their rights while they are working in these destination countries. It is clear that foreign workers are crucial to all three economies, and so in order to keep up with the global demand for migrant workers, these nations must individually assess their issues and make positive developments. Otherwise, other countries will overtake these three in becoming a popular migrant destination country leaving the economies and the livelihood of the society at stake. Migrants should not only be viewed as an asset, as they are individuals that should have access to all the human rights that all human beings deserve. This sometimes appears to be lost in translation and must be properly reconsidered and catered to.

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## 2. Best class debate and presentations by students

### 2.1 Elderly care workers in Japan

*Rodrigo Daniel Rodríguez López*

#### Introduction

Japan is currently one of the most developed countries in the world, mostly due to an impressive economic boom after the Second World War. Their economy grew with unprecedented speed and, combined with the overall healthy lifestyle that many Japanese people follow, it allowed them to live a long life and not have to worry about money all that often. This, combined with a superb working ethic, made Japan a truly powerful country, with no signs of stopping. This however, ended up being only temporary, for this longer life expectancy meant that, after retirement, people would still live for 20, maybe even 30 years, and as such, they live on welfare money for a long time. This also happens in some other countries, so it shouldn't be a huge deal for Japan. However, another problem Japan is facing is its extremely low birth rate. In 2018 merely 900,000 children were born - the first time the total births went below one million in a year. Furthermore, due to Japan's strict practices with regards to foreigners working in the country, the nation suffers from declining workforce and growing proportion of elderly in its population - now over quarter of the population is above 65 and the

proportion is increasing every year. For this reason, and in order to reduce burden on the household economy, some families decide to relocate their elderly in care houses, where they are bound to be treated with care and respect in their final years. While this is the intended outcome, sometimes this is not the case. Either due to the care workers being underprepared, or simply due to being understaffed, it sometimes ends up being a worse fate for the elderly to be sent to one of these houses.

Is there a way to fix this issue? Should Japan just increase the retirement age, in order to keep the workforce going for as long as possible while reducing welfare costs? Should they start hiring foreigners to fill these roles?

#### Main issues

First, there needs to be some baselines established in order to make a comparison. Currently, in Japan, there are 35.88 million people over 65 years of age, a whopping 27.8% of the total population, which is the highest in the world. That said Japan is to cope with a yellow card warning Japan to take major steps to look after the elderly, while trying to increase the birth rate,. This means Japan needs to balance a shrinking workforce with increasing dependency on the welfare services.

Now, usually taking care of the elderly in retirement homes should not be too much of



an issue. However, in view of the sheer number of the elderly in the country, one would assume that the country needs a lot of care workers.

The recent studies by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare revealed that in 2025, there would be a shortage of over 300,000 caregivers in Japan (Aoki, 2016). Most of these shortages will be seen in smaller villages, due to the big cities being attractive to live.

This would lead one to assume that the government would have to take some preventive measures in order to avoid this from happening. The answer to this is the Technical Intern Trainee Program (TITP), and the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).

#### Technical Intern Training Programme

The objective and purpose of the Technical Intern Training Programme is to transfer skills, technologies, and knowledge accumulated in Japan to developing and other regions and to promote international cooperation by contributing to the development of human resources who can play the roles in the economic development of those developing regions. In turn, the particulars of the Technical Intern Training Programme are intended to form employment relationships between corporations, sole proprietors, and other businesses in Japan with technical intern

trainees so that the trainees can acquire, master, or enhance skills etc., which would be difficult to acquire in their home countries. The training period is a maximum of five years, and acquisition of skills etc. is conducted pursuant to technical intern training plans. (Japanese International Training Cooperation Organization, 2016)

#### Economic Partnership Agreement

The Economic Partnership agreement was signed in 2008, bilaterally with Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia, its primary objective was to promote free trade between the countries. However, the EPA also allows for some workers from these countries to come to Japan in order to work and/or receive training in hospitals and caregiving facilities, and to get prepared to take the Japanese national certification for care workers. This would be an excellent answer to expected lack of workers in the future, except for the fact that between 2008 and 2015, the number of people who have passed the national certification exam is only a measly 317 workers. And this is not considering all the workers who have returned to their home countries immediately after receiving this certification (Somewhere around 38% of workers) (Yuko, 2017).

#### Japanese Work Ethic

Here's where one should ask themselves the following question: Why are care workers

quitting or looking for other options, regardless of their nationality - native Japanese or foreign nationals?

One of the most common complaints which has been brought up many times when discussing Japanese work ethic is overworking and unpaid extra hours, plus some less-than-ideal working conditions. This often leads to burnout, depression and even some heart diseases. Some of the foreign workers, who are not used to this type of working ethic, end up being deterred by this. Others do not even work in Japan, as soon as they receive their certification, they decide to go back to their home countries, making the entire training process seem pointless (Satake Yoko, 2019).

### Language Barrier

Another major roadblock is that some foreigners face language barrier. Indonesian and Philippine nationals only receive 6 months of Japanese language training before coming to Japan and receiving another 6 months of training, while Vietnamese immigrants have a bit more (12 months before coming, and an extra 3 months after coming to Japan). This difference ends up affecting the passing rate in the certification exam, for it is above 87% for Vietnamese, while Filipinos and Indonesians barely manage to get 40 and 33 percent in total. Another issue is that the Japanese language classes they receive, and the language they

have to use in real life situations, varies vastly, and this in turn, ends up being another negative point according to their experience while working, and may affect their decision to stay.

For a foreign worker to come to Japan, s/he has to obtain one of many different types of visas, depending on what that person will be doing during their stay:

- EPA Visa: For people either training in a Training Care Worker Facility (up to 2 years), or people training and working in a Nursing home (Up to 3 years)
- Student Visa: For people coming to study in a Nursing school (Up to 2 years)
- TITP Visa: For people training and working in a Nursing home (up to 3 years)

For the student and training visas, one must have a prior permission from the institution where they will be studying, but after that, there is not any sort of monitoring nor follow-up with the foreign workers. This is linked with the rising number of claims amongst the care house owners that the foreign care workers are abusing the elderly they are in charge of. (Nippon.com, 2019) The total number of complaints reached almost 2000 during 2017, and is expected to continue rising.

Now, when it comes to remuneration, the care work industry offers some disheartening figures: In Japan, the average wage for all industries is 330,000 yen per month, while the average revenue for care workers is 220,000 yen per month. This comes up to care workers being paid about 33% less than the average for all industries. In comparison, in Sweden (often seen as the golden standard when it comes to elderly care), the average monthly wage for all industries is the equivalent to 298,000 yen monthly. While the average wage for care workers is an impressive 384,000 yen per month (Salary Explorer, s.f.).

This shows that the perceived value of nursing care is relatively low in Japan, with their wages being lower than the average, while in Sweden it seems to be one of the more important jobs, based on the current figures. One of the reasons for this discrepancy in wages could be the perceived value of Affective Labor.

#### Affective Labor

Affective Labor is defined as "the labor of human contact and interaction, which involves the production and manipulation of affection." For this reason, it is something intangible and, in so, hard to quantify. Japan has always had a bad reputation when it comes to mental health, for it is often disregarded, so it would come as no surprise to know that something that can affect care

workers, simply by being in contact with the people they are meant to take care of, for as heavy as a toll it may have on their mental health, is not regarded all that highly, if regarded at all, despite it being something that can produce a major burnout (Cheyney, 2018).

#### Brain Waste

Another issue a lot of care workers often must worry about when already working, is de-skilling, otherwise known as brain waste. This is defined as the loss of skills due to lack of regular practice or active use and constitutes a type of discrimination that is both an emotional and professional insult. This is because the workers who perform below their qualifications, or perform in areas unrelated to their abilities, often feel discouraged (Kazu, 2018).

*"The Japanese government insists that the acceptance of nurses and caregivers is for the purpose of international cooperation and does not constitute the acceptance of immigrants. Under this reasoning, the nurse and caregiver candidates seem to be positioned as workers who are simply brushing up their skills in Japan, but they are not treated as the skilled workers that they are." (Kazu, 2018)*

With all of this in mind, it is not hard to see now why a lot of foreigners do not wish to come for work to Japan, out of fear of any potential discrimination, plus the reasons formerly mentioned, that is working culture.

## Proposed solutions and policy recommendations

- Regarding the issue of fear of overworking, one possible solution would be to establish labor unions who would enforce some regulations in the total working time for care workers, preventing them from doing overtime, in order to preserve their health. This would not only be useful for foreigners; Japanese nationals would also be benefitted from having their working hours reduced.
- The language barrier is an issue that has already been discussed many times, for it is one of the most common issues foreigners have when coming to Japan, regardless of their motives. Vietnam has already set a nice example, with most of the incoming workers have passed tests, so bumping up the necessary Japanese language training in both Indonesia and the Philippines to the current 12-month program they use in Vietnam, would be expected to allow for the passing rates for both of those countries to increase.
- After their training or studying is over, there should be a way to monitor the foreign workers, in order to make sure they are picking the right jobs for them and preventing problems.
- Care work needs to be acknowledged as something that exists, and also is

extremely important for both the elderly and the workers, for it affects both mentally and emotionally, and, as such, should be one of the most important parameters when choosing someone in the care industry. For this reason, the wages need to be increased. Since they are well below the average wage in Japan, there needs to be some way to attract more people to the industry, whether they are Japanese nationals or foreigners.

Some other, broader recommendations would be to further clarify the motivations behind the EPA: on paper, the idea of bringing foreign workers to be trained in Japan sounds like a good idea, but this is just a short-term solution, for a problem that needs a deeper solution. Besides, it seems like right now, the program is mostly based on filling a quota of workers per year, instead of actually focusing on helping these people develop as much as possible. Forming some labor unions would help to protect the foreign nationals who are working in Japan, for currently it feels like they are mostly by themselves when it comes to finding a job and avoiding other people taking advantage of them, especially with long working hours.

## Conclusions

Due to the rapidly ageing population, Japan will soon be in dire need for more and better care workers. The only way to attain this

while making sure those workers decide to stay in Japan, is to have the system be friendlier with them, i.e. higher wages, flexible work schedules and enhancing learning opportunities for language acquisition. Albeit, the Japanese language is widely considered to be hard to learn for foreigners, but if people are interested in coming to Japan, either for work, study or training, they need to be properly prepared for living in the Japanese society, and language is one of the best ways to ensure the cultural shock to be softer.

An example to follow would be Sweden, where the Government uses 3.6% of its GDP to pay for care services, 94% of all elderly are living in their homes, and each prefecture manages the care workers within its jurisdiction, in order to ensure there will be enough of them wherever they are needed (Swedish Care International, 2018). This, of course, did not happen overnight, and it should be at least proposed to start little by little, in order to see if this method is applicable to Japan, and to help older people who live far away from the big cities, to also have someone to care for them and help them in whatever way they can.

Japan's demographic is unique, and as such, has its own challenges and needs to address them in ways different from the rest of the world. That being said, there is no reason not to learn from the best practices from some other countries and to see if some of the

things they do can be applied here, and help the biggest elderly population in the planet have a nice and peaceful life.

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## 2.2 Japan's Technical Intern Trainee Programme

*Gabriela Nakano and Sarah Birkley*

### Introduction

In contemporary society, Japan is known not only for its technical advancements and economic prosperity but also as one of the

most prosperous countries in the world. However, the nation is faced with unprecedented challenges that may threaten sustained economic growth - aging population, low fertility rate and a fear of losing its ethnic identity or homogeneity. One of the answers Japanese government adopted is the Technical Intern Trainee Program (TITP), through which it attempts to find a way to overcome the challenges - the economic obstacles of the nation while maintaining "homogeneity" and its reluctance to foreigners staying long-term. Originally created "to promote international cooperation by contributing to the development of human resources who can play roles in the economic development of those developing regions" (JITCO, 2019), the programme took a very different path when implemented. The allegations of this migration programme did not fall through, presenting stark gaps between its theory and what is happening in practice. According to an anonymous House of Councilors Diet Member, "although we don't say 'labor power,' trainees and interns are actually labourers in disguise" (Strausz, 2019). The ambiguity of the trainee system facilitates misuse of the status, using applicants to fill in the needed labor work in Japan, without providing the necessary steps of an official labour migrant. This essay will introduce a background of this programme, and demonstrate its distance to its practice, then propose an adequate policy change.

## Background

The TITP was created in 1989 as the result of the intensive debates regarding the labour shortages due to declining population amongst Japan's Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in response to the increasing need of workforce. The first version of the programme allowed trainees to stay in Japan for solely one year, extended to one to three years in 1993. Irregularities started in 2001, with bribery scandals and exploitation of the workers, revealing the cracks of this migration effort. The TITP even made it to the US Trafficking in Persons report, expanding to international audiences and causing pressure on the Japanese government to do something about the issues. Despite reforms in 2009 that promoted full protection of the trainees under a "work trainee" status, exploitation statistics continued to increase (Strausz, 2019). In fact, it is assumed that the re-extension of years in 2014 to a 3 to 6 year stay in Japan is a response to the increase in need for 3D (Dirty, dangerous, difficult) job workers due to the Fukushima disaster in 2011 and upcoming Tokyo Olympics in 2020 (Strausz, 2019, 82). Explained in more detail in the following sections, migrants under the TITP took up decontamination jobs that no Japanese national wanted to risk doing. According to the Washington Post, in 2018 "around 270,000 foreigners, many from Vietnam, China, the Philippines and Indonesia, work(ed) in Japan under the TITP programme. The number of workers rose 20

percent between 2016 and 2017" (Denyer & Kashiwagi). As of 2019, abuses are still occurring, ranging from underpayment, to disappearances and unreported deaths.

## Issues

As a result of the gap between the purpose and practice of the TITP mentioned in the introduction, foreign workers involved face major violations as labour workers and human beings. While engaging in low-skilled sectors and 3D jobs, they tend to form the hidden, camouflaged, and isolated community within Japan. Treated as temporary labour force, foreigners under the TITP endure injustices from wage underpayment and working long hours, to blank contracts, neglect of important information about jobs and host country, and even physical violence. Many of the violators are small to medium enterprises and organisations, particularly in the textile sector and agriculture sector (Osumi, 2019). The next section will further explain cases of Vietnamese, Chinese and Indonesian trainees in Japan.

## Case studies

First, the country with the most nationals coming into Japan through the TITP is Vietnam, with 338 sending organisations according to Japan International Training Cooperation Organisation (JITCO). In response to the need of labor in 3D jobs, Vietnamese low-skilled workers are one of the resources the Japanese government turns

to. Rather than training this community with jobs in which they can acquire skills to bring back to their home country, TITP applicants are put into jobs which no Japanese national wants to do. In other words, the TITP becomes a program benefiting only Japan, conversely from its original intention. The Fukushima disaster is one significant illustration of this. In September of 2019, Vietnamese trainees sued Hiwada Corporation for deviously installing them in decontamination work in Fukushima prefecture reinforcing steel placement and formwork installation (Kyodo News, 2019). Without being provided proper explanation on decontamination work, these Vietnamese workers were exposed to serious health risks.

Next, with 269 sending organisations recruiting trainees for the TITP, China is the country that sends the second most foreign low-skilled workers through the program. In fact, a lot of the scandals concerning the Chinese population are linked to corruption among these private sending agencies mostly through deceptive recruitment. There are inconsistencies between what is told to trainees by the intermediary and the reality of their work and lifestyle in Japan. For instance, recruiters exaggerate about workdays, workloads and wages. For example, a research by *Verité* in 2018 interviewing 27 Chinese trainees in Japan revealed that on average, these low-skilled workers are promised RMB 300,000 (USD 45,718) in three years of training by labor

agents before migrating to Japan, but in reality they earn on average RMB 220,000 (USD 33,526).

Targeting mostly developing Asian countries, another sending country to Japan through the TITP is Indonesia. Research conducted in 2010 reports that many of the Indonesian trainees communicate problems concerning the workplace condition, majority working in metal, plastic and food production industries. For example, their major problems are hot temperature, dangerous tasks of cutting and shifting, night shifts, lack of hygiene and proper infrastructure. Moreover, they claimed working with other trainees from Thailand and the Philippines, additionally to Brazilian *Nikkeijin* (Nawawi, 2010).

#### Efforts by the Japanese government

In the face of these problems, the Japanese government has taken punitive measures. In 2019, Japanese authorities sanctioned 112 firms for violating labor laws and trainees' rights. "The firms have been banned from accepting foreign trainees for up to five years," Immigration Services Agency claimed to the Japan Times. Notably, Mitsubishi and Panasonic Corporations were among those banned, for problems of giving tasks not specified in the trainees' contract, and overwork, respectively. In the Panasonic case, the company was also fined 300,000 yen in spring 2018. (Asahi Shimbun, 2019). Moreover, under the new laws put into effect in November 2017, company supervisors can



face up to 10 years in prison or fined 3 million yen in cases of physical abuse (Osumi, 2019). Continuing violations demonstrate that these efforts are not enough. The final section will propose a policy change necessary for the integrity of the low-skilled foreign trainee community in Japan.

### Policy proposal

As demonstrated, although Japan is in severe need of foreign labor, the government presents reluctance to accepting outsiders within the country for a long-term, resorting to programs like the TITP. The following section proposes a policy change on the basis of a comparative approach between Japan's migration policies and those of the Republic of Korea. With the goal of creating a more transparent system that protects the human rights of the foreign workers, three main steps will be taken: a contextual comparison, policy comparison and result comparison between the two Asian countries.

#### I. Contextual comparison

In order to successfully propose a policy change based on a comparative approach, it must be reassured that the two models in comparison are compatible. That is, comparable- not comparing apples with oranges but apples with apples. For this, the section will serve as a demonstration of how the Republic of Korea can be used as a model for Japan's future migration policies.

Both among the top five Asian countries (Japan being number one and South Korea being number four), based on criteria such as entrepreneurship, cultural influence, power and quality of life, among others (Moudoukoutas, 2018), they are comparable in terms of development and priority of policy changes. Both governments are focused on enlarging business and investment and keeping the economy stable in the face of demographic changes. In 1990, Japan's fertility rate declined below replacement level 1.5, and marked the start of their worries. Today, in combination with an aging population with 27.6% of the inhabitants in 2018 aging 65 or above (World Bank, 2018), and slowly growing labor force, the country presents stark labor shortages. According to the ILO (1994) job vacancies exceeded job seekers by 46% in 1992. RoK deals with similar obstacles. In the 1980's, the nation faced consistent labor shortages due to rapid industrialization, emigration and economic development, an aging population with 14.4% of its population 65 years or above (World Bank, 2018) and declining fertility rate to 1.05 in 2017 (World Bank) (ILO, 2015). The Asian countries are also similar in traditionality, presenting strong roots to their cultures and consequently preventing slow progress in the liberalist views encouraged in the globalized world of today. As an illustration, Japan and RoK have the highest gender pay gap, 24.5 percent and 34.6 percent, respectively, among the OECD countries (Pak & Jewell, 2019). Therefore,

not only do the two countries display similarities in macro perspectives based on demographic transformations, but micro perspectives when regarding cultural experiences of the people. We will focus on the former, specifically how governments can and should rely on migration to solve the repercussions of these transformations. As similar contexts, what is applied and works in RoK has a high probability of being successful in Japan, and vice versa. The next section will focus on RoK's solutions to the labor shortages in comparison with the TITP of Japan.

## II. Policy comparison

In the face of the labor shortages in the 1980's the government of the RoK created the Industrial Trainee Scheme (ITS) in 1994. Inspired by Japan's TITP created in 1989 as mentioned previously, many elements were borrowed from the Japanese program, setting similar goals and implementing similar administration. The objective was to manage the entry and residence of low-skilled foreign nationals under a non-worker status, a trainee status. The recruitment was also mostly accomplished through private agencies rather than governmental institutions. Having so many similarities to the TITP, the ITS unfortunately resulted in similar problems concerning human rights violations through exploitation of the low-skilled workers along with an increase of undocumented workers in the country. According to the Ministry of Employment and

Labor (MOEL) in 2010, the total number of undocumented workers under the ITS rose proportionately to the total number of migrant workers: in 2002, out of 369,000 migrant workers, 290,000 were undocumented, while in 1998, out of 168,000, 99,000 were undocumented (ILO, 2015). Recognising that the scheme brought more problems than solutions to the prosperity of RoK, the government decided to transition from a trainee system to an employment system in 2004. From that year until 2007, the ITS became the Employment Permit System (EPS). This system permits companies that cannot obtain domestic workers to legally hire foreign workers of appropriate size" (Cho, 2019). As its three main pillars, the EPS fills the labor gaps in 3D related jobs, preventing corruption of the system and securing transparency in the name of the foreigners' human rights, while making sure to protect native employment.

## III. Result comparison

Despite facing similar problems with the ITS, the government actively transformed the system rather than reforming it continuously like Japan, and thanks to this is presenting much more positive results. Among these are a clearer structure to policies and support in skills that encourage and facilitate their social mobility such as Korean language aid before and after arrival. Following the ILO principle 12: "An orderly and equitable process of labour migration should be promoted in both origin and destination

countries to guide male and female migrant workers through all stages of migration,” with the transition to EPS, the RoK presented a stable guidance for the migrant workers throughout all stages of migration. Furthermore, there was a decrease in the rate of irregular stay mentioned before. Under the ITS, the rate of irregular stay was 60-70% and under the EPS this declined to 7.7% according to the MOEL in 2011 (ILO, 2015).

### Policy proposal

With this comparative approach, this section will cite and explain four potential policy changes that will put Japan on RoK’s successful track. Through these changes, Japan can gradually transition into an employment system rather than stay in a trainee system, that has proved itself to be a propagator of human right violations for years now. Reforms have been inefficient and unreliable, hence the following four specific changes in coordination, recruitment, departure assistance and duration.

First, differently from the Japanese TITP operated by five ministries, namely the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation, the RoK’s EPS is operated by one Committee for Foreign Workers under the Office of the Prime Minister (Milly, 2014). Concentrating operations on one official

group rather than multiple ministries, allows compact control of what is happening, along with productivity in research and recording data. Focusing on different aspects of the program, the Japanese ministries conduct divergent studies, causing decisions to be done much less quickly. The transition from the ITS to the EPS from 2004 to 2007 was the work of one concentrated group of people and is what allowed such good results initially and continuously.

Second, with recruitment through private agencies, the TITP opened doors to corruption by means of lack of accountability of the hundreds of sending organisations, exploitation of brokers and viewing workers as commodities due to the competitiveness between the agencies. The EPS abolished private recruitment and implemented public recruitment by the government, based in the Committee for Foreign Workers mentioned above. With a governmental foundation, application, selection and contract processes become more structured and accounted for. Moreover, the EPS allows a change of employer in the occurrence of problems. If the trainee becomes dissatisfied, feels exploited or mistreated, he/she is able to apply to change into better circumstances (Milly, 2014). This is not possible under the TITP, with static employers until departure. A transition from private recruitment to public recruitment is another step necessary for the amelioration of immigration of low-skilled foreign workers in Japan.

Third, one of the reasons the EPS presented positive outcomes is its services provided to the employees throughout all stages of migration. With services such as language aid, employment training, sojourn support and return support, the employment system constitutes of 10 steps (Cho, 2019) in order to ensure the well-being of the worker in the new country. Furthermore, it provides complaint mechanisms through MOEL and access to foreign workers' help-desk while the workers are in RoK. Meanwhile, the TITP has support restricted to pre-departure and post-departure lectures to inform their rights and obligations (Milly, 2014). There is a lack of ground for the trainees to stand on.

Lastly, the duration of the stay through the EPS is renewable and extendable. Despite keeping strict control of who stays and who leaves in order to please national workers (Cho, 2019), this system allows workers above thirty-nine years to extend their period of sojourn up to four years and ten months (Milly, 2014). There is consideration of both national and international populations in the country, meaning consideration of the human rights and success of all. Being able to extend one's stay, the worker is given more opportunity to demonstrate skills and contributions to the RoK's economy, that also benefits from the work provided. Therefore, changing into a policy of renewable and extendable stay would be a win-win situation for Japan,

contributing not only to the well-being of foreign trainees as a distinguished member of the international community, but also to national labor shortages.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, Japan's Technical Intern Trainee Program is in serious need of a transformation. For years, it has created opportunities for exploitation of low-skilled workers from several Asian developing countries in particular. In the face of complications like those brought by the TITP to Japan, using successes of other countries is an efficient approach to the cosmopolitan world with constant political, economic and cultural transformations. Especially migration policies, there must be adaptations to this globalised characteristic, that Japan has not kept up with in the name of traditionality. RoK, not only geographically close but economically and somewhat culturally similar as well, explained previously, has taken one step further than Japan by opening its doors to foreign low-skilled workers through the EPS, abolishing the trainee system of ITS and showing very positive results. Japan, through the first four initial policy changes proposed, will take the necessary steps to have positive outcomes as well. Changes must be made to turn away from the tendency of treating low-skilled foreigners and trainees as "disposable commodities to fill an immediate need, not an investment" (Toshihiro, 2019).

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## Chapter 3

### Conclusion

More than 100 students participated in this course on Migration and Development for the past four years. It covered some actual cases of international migration around the globe so that students will comprehend the universal nature of migration as well as specific causes and consequences of migration. We spared a few sessions for theories of migration as well in order to help students analyse causes well. It was particularly rewarding to see how students reacted to the cases of sheer violation human and labour rights in numerous workplaces both in known democracies and in nations with weaker democratic and legal institutions. It took some time for student to realise that violation and exploitations of migrants are happening in this modern age. I hope students realised that the world is still faced with archaic practices regardless with the level of advancement in the development of the nations.

The student also realised that the role of the states are rather limited as the movement of people in this globalised world is difficult to control. However, it is vital that the states create fair work environment free of exploitation and human rights violations. Feedbacks I received from students made me happy as the course aroused strong interest in international migration and have helped them gain some basic ability to analyse issues pertaining to international migration. It is heartening to know that some decided to take masters courses in international migration. Some may pursue jobs in international organisations such as UN, trade unions, media and NGOs or continue research to shed light on the critical issues.

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### **Course Materials**

All the PowerPoint presentations used during this course will be available on the Open Course Ware website: <https://ocw.cc.sophia.ac.jp/lecture/migrationanddevelopment/>







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